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Setting the Stage 
 This is a thesis about ghosts. Ghosts, as I engage with them throughout the following 
pages, are not merely those entities that haunt the fringes of the human psyche; the uncanny 
encounters that, when they are spoken of, are endlessly qualified with the many different ways 
there are of saying "I don't believe in ghosts, but..." Ghosts, as I will argue, are materially 
constitutive of the world; they are the chair you sit on, the mass extinction event you are living 
through; they are the paper you hold in your hands and the thoughts you have as you read these 
words.  
 Thinking things as ghosts is inherently tricky. It requires approaches that are at odds with 
many of the material, political, philosophical, and linguistic structures we are comfortable with. 
As such, many of the arguments made in this thesis aim to subvert the dominant (material, 
political, philosophical, ideological) narratives that structure our thought and means of 
organizing ourselves. It is for this reason that the language and argument structure of the 
ontology I outline within avoids the well-travelled thoroughfares of much contemporary 
philosophical discourse, following instead those roadside pathways that meander along deer 
trails to creekbeds and fallen trees and things that go bump in the night, seeking, through 
experimentation in language and form, to (re)establish relations with things beyond the human; 
decentering and unsettling humankind and reaching toward new political and philosophical 
imaginaries in the process. Through this play with language we can begin to catch glimpses of 
the flickering, shimmering real that bureaucratized philosophies and practices have devoted 
themselves to sterilizing.  
 The philosophical works I reference throughout draw mainly from the fledgling camp of 
speculative realism, particularly the field of object-oriented ontology (OOO), whose special 
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blend of phenomenology and realism, I believe, has the best chance of navigating the many 
worlds of the Anthropocene.1 Much theoretical guidance has also come from the field of 
anthropology, notably the work of Anna Tsing, whose work The Mushroom at the End of the 
World inspired me to pursue a thesis in the first place. The people I've met throughout my 
participation in political organizing have also greatly influenced my understanding of the world 
and the arguments I put forward here. Many of the things I learned while researching for this 
thesis could not have happened without their love and immense knowledge, nor without the 
lessons in humility that can only be learned through the joys and frustrations of organizing. 
 This thesis is divided, roughly, into three sections. The first works to conjure the ghosts 
of colonialism and colonization into view, connecting the metaphysical views that underwrite 
colonial thought with the immense violence they unleased and continue to enact in the world. 
The second seeks to outline an ontology, a belief about the nature of being, that allows for a 
broader spectrum of the spectral vibrancy of materials to become thinkable; it is an attempt to 
theorize 'things' as lively, active members of the worlds they inhabit and create; a kind of being 
in the world I explore through thinking things as ghosts. The third and final section posits some 
principles of coexistence with these ghosts, these lively materials, drawing from relational 
practices of resonance to posit tuning as an ethical orientation. 
 As I have already invoked the term, it deserves a brief introduction. What is the 
Anthropocene? Generally, it is the geological epoch marked by anthropogenic deposits of 
concretes, pesticides, plastics, and radioactive isotopes in the Earth's crust.2 These 
                                               
1 More on this term in a moment.   
2 Waters, C. N., J. Zalasiewicz, C. Summerhayes, A. D. Barnosky, C. Poirier, A. Ga uszka, and A. Cearreta et al. 




"technofossils" are created by humans; the anthropos of the Anthropocene. Naming this epoch as 
the Anthropocene is hotly debated, however; terms such as Capitalocene and Plantationocene 
have also been introduced to emphasize the role of capitalism and colonial plantation agriculture, 
respectively, in the production of this epoch. Donna Haraway suggests this era deserves many 
names, among them the Chthulucene, a term that "entangles myriad temporalities and spatialities 
and myriad intra-active entities-in-assemblages—including more-than-human, other-than-
human, inhuman, and human-as-humus."3 
 Capitalocene, Plantationocence, and Chthulucene all point to very important aspects of 
the geophysical era we live in: It is certainly true that many of the anthropogenic deposits in 
Earth's crust emerged from capitalist webs of production, which themselves emerged from 
plantation-style colonial agricultural practices; webs that snare and enlist human, more-than-
human, other-than-human, and inhuman entities. However, throughout this thesis I will name the 
geological era we live in as the Anthropocene for a few reasons, though I could probably be 
talked out of it. Firstly, the Anthropocene has, in recent years, united scientists, theorists, poets, 
writers, musicians, and artists of all stripes in investigating the impact of humankind on the 
ecological assemblages in which we are immersed and fostered a great deal of cross-disciplinary 
discussions on possibilities for addressing and surviving these impacts alongside our fellow 
critters. This, I believe, is a testament to its versatility. Secondly, Anthropocene cuts right to the 
chase with respect the party responsible: humankind. Greenhouse gas emissions, plastics, and 
radioactive waste all have severe impacts on ecologies, regardless of the gender, race, or 
ideological affiliation of the humans who produce or use them, even as some humans are 
                                               
3 Haraway, Donna. 2015. "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making 




certainly more implicated in the emergence and spread of those materials than others, and as the 
toxic presence of these materials in ecological arrangements is distributed through unequal 
relations of power amongst humans and nonhumans. However, the fact remains that it is 
humankind that precipitated the Anthropocene, not jellyfish or bacteria; "man is the only animal 
to voraciously, relentlessly, and viciously wreck the lifeworld of earth."4 
 Though my use of the term Anthropocene remains precarious, this much is certain: we 
anthropos, alongside everything else on Earth, are caught in the vice grip of an entity that 
extends beyond the bounds of imaginable time and threatens to render the planet unlivable, and 
insofar as any of us use air conditioning, produce carbon emissions, or consciously or 
unconsciously uphold destructive material relations of power, we are implicated in its 
perpetuation. Its boundaries are unclear, and we have barely begun to understand its effects. 
Thinking and doing differently, in ways that will not force us into choosing extinction, is an 
urgent necessity. Before we can do that, however, we ought to ask ourselves; how did we get 
here? 
  
                                               
4 Bird Rose, Deborah. 2017. "Shimmer; When All You Love Is Being Trashed". In Arts Of Living On A Damaged 




 The Marrow 
 
There was a word inside a stone. 
I tried to pry it clear, 
mallet and chisel, pick and gad, 
until the stone was dropping blood, 
but still I could not hear 
the word the stone had said. 
 
I threw it down beside the road 
among a thousand stones 
and as I turned away it cried 
the word aloud within my ear 
and the marrow of my bones 
heard, and replied.5 
 
  
                                               
5 LeGuin, Ursula. 2017. Qtd in "Deep in Admiration". In Arts Of Living On A Damaged Planet, M15-M21. 
University of Minnesota Press, M17. 
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I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable 
and we should face up to that … I’ve always thought that countries in Africa are vastly under polluted; 
their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles … Just between you and me, 
shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the Least Developed 
Countries? 
 —Lawrence Summers, in an internal memo to the World Bank 
 
Anyone who denies the law of non-contradiction should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be 
beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned.  
 —Avicenna 
 
In decolonization, there is therefore a need of a complete calling in question of the colonial situation. 
 —Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 
 
Philosophy, Bureaucracy, and Violence 
 Abstract: The ghosts of Mesopotamia haunt our thoughts. In their fear for the playfulness 
of being, farmers in the cradle of Civilization spread bureaucracy throughout the planet; 
plowing through ecologies and possessing the whole of anthropos in the process. Colonization 
brought this mutilation of the real to a planetary scale, and blinded us to its effects. The 
discovery of the Anthropocene is the discovery of the wreckage of bureaucracy, the wreckage 
wrought by Civilization.  
 There are many blocks to thinking global warming and the Anthropocene. Many of these 
blocks relate to the fact that the lenses and languages we have to think through, notably the 
modernist construct of Progress and the hierarchies and notions of purity it ships with it, are not 
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only structurally incapable of accommodating the entities we encounter in the Anthropocene but 
are directly implicated in its emergence. The aim of this section is to connect some of the 
philosophical foundations of modernist projects, among them settler colonialism and the 
continued colonial present, to the violence they unleashed into the world that today manifests as 
the Anthropocene. What we discover in illuminating these ties is that the ontological grounding 
that justifies colonialism and the ecological violence that precipitated the Anthropocene did not 
first appear in modern, liberal philosophies, but finds its first expression through the bureaucratic 
foundations of Mesopotamia—that is, in the very basis of Modern Civilization.  
 It should be made clear that no amount of theoretical discussion can begin to do justice to 
the horrors of colonization. Because the aim of this thesis is primarily philosophical rather than 
historical, in this respect the discussions of colonization that follow are incredibly limited. For a 
fuller history and theoretical discussion of the violence enacted through the process of 
colonization, see Byrd (2011).  
 Before we can think the Anthropocene and its causes as a cacophony of entities operating 
at and across a plethora of scales, we have to be able to think violence beyond the spectacular. 
Hitting someone over the head with a stick is an easy-to-think, human-sized violence; we can see 
it happen and can usually pick out the parties involved with relative ease. But violence of this 
spectacular kind is far from the only sorts of violence that happen, and far from the only sort 
humankind is implicated in. There are also the many different forms of slow violence, a term I 
borrow from Rob Nixon. Slow violence is "a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a 
violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence 
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that is typically not viewed as violence at all . . . [whose] calamitous repercussions [play] out 
across a range of temporal scales."6  
 Thinking slow violence poses many challenges, "not only because it is spectacle 
deficient, but also because the fallout's impact may range from the cellular to the transnational 
and (depending on the specific character of the chemical or radiological hazard) may stretch 
beyond the horizon of imaginable time."7 The overlapping and enfolded scales of the cellular and 
the transnational, coupled with the inconceivably large time scales at which entities like 
radioactive waste and carbon emissions exist seriously problematize, or, more accurately, tear to 
shreds, ways of thinking that can't be bothered to think beyond human-size, much less beyond 
the human. In particular, the massive entities revealed through thinking slow violence, what 
Timothy Morton calls hyperobjects,8 burst the bubble of the longstanding 'substance-with-
accidents' model of the universe that underpins the modern nation-state, along with its logical 
relative, the metaphysics of presence. 
Substance with Accidents, Metaphysics of Presence 
 The substance-with-accidents ontology is first articulated through Aristotle, who 
formalized an ontology cleaved into matter and form.9 In the Aristotelian ontology, "matter is 
                                               
6 Nixon, Rob. 2011. Slow Violence And The Environmentalism Of The Poor. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2. 
7 Ibid., 47. 
8 A further discussion of hyperobjects is the subject of Ghosts: An Ontology of Play. 
9 The target here is no so much Aristotelian thought in all its iterations as it is the particular elements of Aristotelian 
thought that do provide the philosophical foundation for enacting structural violence. Regardless of the benefits of 
certain aspects or contemporary reformulations of Aristotelian thought, of which there are a few among the object-
oriented view, some of his philosophical positions directly enable violence at many scales and are the basis of many 
institutions and practices that continue to do immense harm in the world. These are the targets of this section. 
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nothing definite at all until enformed;"10 it is an easy think matter, a bland, shapeless whatever. 
This compound of matter and form makes a substance, the particular things of the world like a 
horse or shelf. The particular qualities substances have, like being green or pale or stringy, are 
not, in Aristotle's view, reflective of the inner reality of substance, but are instead merely 
sprinkled on top of whatever emerges from the marriage of matter and form; qualities are 
contingently held, decorative accidents. Further, form just is the primary kind of substance in 
Aristotle's view; the essences of things are the base level of their reality, and their appearance in 
the world as tired, sad, growing, or pink are not only irrelevant to an understanding of their core 
being, they may just as well be accidents—distractions from whatever lies beneath.11  
 Judith Butler notes how Aristotle, along with many other Greek philosophers, 
coarticulate matter with the feminine—already leading us toward some of the social relations 
presupposed and reproduced by this ontology.12 Matter remains inert, a pure kind of potentiality, 
until it is contacted by some essence, or form, which is the primary existent in Aristotelian 
thought. "In reproduction," Butler adds, "women are said to contribute the matter; men, the 
form."13 The substance-with-accidents ontology presents the subjugation of women as a basic 
fact of being.  
 The substances-with-accidents ontology is what underlies the kind of agricultural 
devastation witnessed in the dust bowl. Indeed, the Aristotelian ontology is the formalized 
                                               
10 "Aristotle". 2015. Stanford Encyclopedia Of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/. 
11 I refer to essences here in the kind of fixed, immutable form they are traditionally conceived.  
12 Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies That Matter, 31. 
13 Ibid. Butler continues this section to rearticulate a possible redeployment of some Aristotelian terminology to 
serve contemporary feminist projects and motivate new ways for bodies to matter. 
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agrilogistic ontological position; the belief about being necessary to justify the spread of 
homogenized agriculture.14 In the Aristotelian view, a field remains a field regardless of how it 
is sown, fertilized, depleted, or developed, because its particular qualities are never reflective of 
the form or essence of the field, which is the more real version anyway. All we're doing when we 
homogenize vast swaths of crops is messing around with lumpy old matter! It's still a field! 
Never mind the pesticides and drought. "A field is a substance underlying its accidents: cats 
happen, rodents happen, bees and flowers happen, even wheat happens; the slate can always be 
wiped clean."15 In positing substance as entirely distinct from its appearance, the substance-with-
accidents ontology inherently promotes a blindness to the effects of human engagement with our 
surroundings; claiming that nothing really happens to the field when we plow it, grow things on 
it, clear-cut it, or build a mall on it—it remains essentially the same field throughout all these 
engagements. Agrilogistics can't yet plow ahead, however, without the added condition that form 
is fundamentally knowable; that is, entirely subsumable into its relationships with humans.  
 Enter the metaphysics of presence. In tandem with the flavorless lump ontology given to 
us by agrilogistics, and formalized by Aristotle, the metaphysics of presence asserts that "to exist 
is to be constantly present,"16 which is to say entirely transparent. Being means to be as given; 
there is no opacity, nothing in excess, to any particular relation (or, at least, to human relations 
with nonhumans). "Here is the field: I can plough it, sow it with this or that or nothing, farm 
cattle, yet it remains constantly the same. The entire system is construed as constantly present, 
                                               
14 Agrilogistics is Timothy Morton's term for the twelve-thousand-year functioning of a specific logistics of 
agriculture, that arose in the Fertile Crescent and continues to plow ahead today; dominating agricultural techniques 
planetwide. Morton develops this definition throughout Morton (2016).  
15 Morton, Timothy. 2016. Dark Ecology. Colombia University Press, 50. 
16 Ibid., 48. 
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rigidly bounded, separated from nonhuman systems."17 Agrilogistics, the substance-with-
accidents ontology combined with the metaphysics of presence, is an aggressively reductive and 
exploitative system; not only is matter, the physical stuff of the world, entirely formless and thus 
endlessly and inconsequentially malleable, the forms of things, their true, inner realities, are 
"mixed into the preconceived transparency of universal models"18 and thus rendered fully visible 
to human correlators, their being entirely exhaustible within human systems.19  
 There are a few basic mechanics of the substance-with-accidents ontology and the 
metaphysics of presence that are of particular importance in colonizing projects that are worth 
conjuring explicitly, as it may help to connect their operation in contemporary modernity and 
political liberalism to their emergence in early Mesopotamian society. These are; the production 
of discrete and identifiable categories (particularly in hierarchized binaries), naturalization of 
said categories, and the imposition of few and simple rules to govern by; rules founded on, and 
employed in defense of, these discrete, 'Natural' categories. Each of these mechanics is 
foundational to bureaucratic reasoning, which David Graeber credits with the top-down 
managerial capability that provides the logistical and ideological foundation of the modern 
nation-state.  
Categories, Essences, and Colonial Violence 
 "Colonial authority," writes Ann Stoler, "was constructed on two powerful but false 
premises. The first was the notion that Europeans in the colonies made up an easily identifiable 
                                               
17 Ibid.  
18 Glissant, Édouard, and Betsy Wing. 2010. Poetics Of Relation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 193. 
19 Discussions of the metaphysics of presence and its hostility towards ecological thinking have been a primary 
target for deconstruction. See Derrida (1976).  
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and discrete biological and social entity . . . The second was the related notion that the 
boundaries separating colonizer and colonized were self-evident and easily drawn."20 Here, we 
can see the substance-with-accidents ontology and the metaphysics of presence hard at work: 
The European form is cast as a substance, "a 'natural' community of common class interests, 
racial attributes, political affinities, and superior culture;"21 the colonial community is an 
undifferentiated lump of European-ness. This lump, true to the functioning of the metaphysics of 
presence, is knowable—the dotted line between colonizer and colonized is self-evident, one 
merely needs to cut along it.  
 The production of discrete, identifiable, and easily drawn categories of being is the 
"systematic form of organizing knowledge" that made it "possible to debate [ideas about 
classification] in rational and 'scientific' ways."22 Scientific rationalism, most famously 
championed by René Descartes, came to dominate colonial thought, and "the production of 
knowledge, new knowledge and transformed 'old' knowledge, ideas about the nature of 
knowledge, and the validity of specific forms of knowledge, became as much commodities of 
colonial exploitation as other natural resources."23 Further, "these systems for organizing, 
classifying, and storing new knowledge, and for theorizing the meanings of such discoveries, 
constituted research. In a colonial context, however, this research was undeniably also about 
                                               
20 Stoler, Ann. 2010. Carnal Knowledge And Imperial Power. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 42. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. 2010. "Colonizing Knowledges". In Indigenous Archaeologies; A Reader On 
Decolonization, 57-62. Left Coast Press, 57. 
23 Ibid., 58. 
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power and domination."24 As Frederick Douglass remarks, "this is, you know, an age of science, 
and science is favorable to division."25 
 The division between colonizer and colonized was articulated largely through a binary 
that separated Nature and Civilization.26 Within the ontological system established by 
agrilogistics, Nature is merely "the inert stage on which historical events take place," a purely 
"passive material with which [white, male, European] humans make their world;"27 Nature is 
matter, and Civilization is form. Indigenous peoples, identified by colonists as distinctly outside 
of Civilization, "were classified alongside the flora and fauna."28 In the colonial imaginary, "this 
world divided into compartments, this world cut in two is inhabited by two different species;"29 
the colonizer—bringer of Civilization, and the colonized—backward, passive, and brute. As 
Fanon remarks; "when the settler seeks to describe the native fully in exact terms he constantly 
refers to the bestiary."30 
 According to Fanon, the ideological division between Nature and Civilization embodied 
in the material division between colonizer and Native is "obedient to the rules of pure 
Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity." Further, between 
                                               
24 Ibid. 
25 Douglass, Frederick. 1854. "The Claims Of The Negro, Ethnologically Considered.". Address, Western Reserve 
College, 1854, 9. 
26 This binary has near-endless iterations, though many of them carry similar, if not the same, theoretical baggage. 
The stark division between Subject and (non-OOO) Object is one that will be challenged in the following section.  
27 Coronil, Fernando. 2008. The Magical State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 23. 
28 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, "Colonizing Knowledges", 58. 
29 Fanon, Frantz. 1963. The Wretched Of The Earth. New York: Grove Press, 40. 
30 Ibid., 42. 
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these parts, "no conciliation is possible, for of the two terms, one is superfluous."31 Just as, for 
Aristotle,  form is the base level of reality and matter is merely the passive means through which 
form expresses itself, for the colonist the same relation pertains; between Civilization and 
Nature, the forces and peoples of Civilization are the primary existent and Nature, which in 
colonial thought includes naturalized Indigenous peoples, women (both human beings and 
popular imaginaries such as Mother Earth), manufactured Others, and any and all nonhumans, 
are the raw matter through which Civilization enacts itself. 
 "The instruments or technologies of research" utilized in this colonial rationalist context 
"were also instruments of knowledge and instruments for legitimating various colonial 
practices."32 The scientistic compartmentalization of Nature and Civilization situated within the 
agrilogistic ontology necessarily produced "hierarchical typologies of humanity and systems of 
representation," which were "fueled by new discoveries"33 made by the major European powers 
in the colonial laboratory of the 'new' world. "Hence," Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes, "some 
indigenous peoples were ranked above others in terms of such things as the belief that they were 
'nearly human,' 'almost human' or 'sub-human.'"34 Never accepted as full human persons, 
however, "ideas, images, and experiences about the [Native] Other helped to shape and delineate 
the essential differences between Europe and the rest."35 These preconceived essential 
                                               
31 Ibid., 38-39. 
32 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, "Colonizing Knowledges", 58. 
33 Ibid. 




differences were then "recast within the framework of Enlightenment philosophies, the industrial 
revolution and the scientific 'discoveries' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries."36  
 The essentialized difference between European colonists and colonized peoples was 
expressed through practices aimed at preserving the 'purity' of colonial powers. The perceived 
transparency of essence, a consequence of the metaphysics of presence, lent the standards of 
purity divined from colonial science and European cultural imaginaries the legitimacy of lucid, 
scientifically sound demarcations of the essential differences imposed between colonizers and 
colonized Natives. Boundaries between Europeans and Native peoples were established and 
subsequently enforced through regulation and violence, as we have already addressed. One 
particularly involved colonial effort, notes Ann Stoler, was the focus on sexual encounter as a 
means of regulating inclusion and exclusion: "Colonial observers and participants in the imperial 
enterprise appear to have had an unlimited interest in the sexual interface of the colonial 
encounter. No subject is discussed more than sex in colonial literature and no subject more 
frequently invoked to foster the racist stereotypes of European society."37 The "gender-specific 
sexual sanctions and prohibitions not only demarcated positions of power but also prescribed the 
personal and public boundaries of race."38  
 So, too, were internal national boundaries enforced along similar criteria.  
 While lands colonized by American westward expansion were economically rationalized 
and developed to serve the rapidly growing industrial needs of the nation (through the 
                                               
36 Ibid. 
37 Ann Stoler, Carnal Knowledge And Imperial Power, 43. 
38 Ibid., 42. 
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application of agrilogistics), environmentalist movements began to emerge across the country in 
response to the destruction of what they believed were some of the most important national 
wonders. Less than a century after Native peoples were officially considered persons by the 
federal government,39 Aldo Leopold, in 1949, lamented that human use of wilderness was 
destroying "the pure essence of outdoor America."40 Early articulations of environmentalist 
concerns were, and to a great extent still are, operating within the substance-with-accidents 
ontology and were employed in benefit of the expansion of colonial power throughout the 'new' 
world as well as the perpetuation of discourse surrounding racial and national purity—
empowering empire towards a more thorough eradication of Native peoples in colonized lands. 
As Jake Kosek points out, pro-environment discourses concerned with the destruction of Natural 
spaces were articulated through the very same frameworks that bracketed colonial discussions of 
race and exclusion; "understandings of and fears surrounding race at the turn of the twentieth 
century became the raw substance out of which wilderness as an idea and a landscape was 
formed."41  
 An obsession with 'pure' Nature built on the stark division between the 'impure' functions 
of modern society and the racialized purity of 'uncontaminated' Wilderness manifested yet 
another iteration of the colonial myth about the strict difference between Nature and Civilization. 
"By feeding on the prevailing fears of that particular moment in American history, [early 
environmentalists] galvanized support for wilderness preservation; the importance of 
                                               
39 Indian people were not considered persons in federal law until 1879. See Echo-Hawk (2000).  
40 Qtd. in Kosek, Jake. 2004. "Purity And Pollution: Racial Degradation And Environmental Anxieties.". 
In Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements. Routledge. 
41 Ibid., 97. 
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maintaining in perpetuity the purity of the nation’s environment—the very environment that was 
said to embody white nationalism and help forge the nation’s individual character and 
institutions—resonated with popular understandings and fears of the nature of race."42 True to 
one radical pamphlet’s observation, that "so long as there exists man and environment, the police 
will be there between them," the US Army was deployed to "keep out undesirables," in 
Yosemite, namely "Hispanics and Native American grazers."43 "Indeed," Kosek points out, "this 
type of 'pure,' 'natural' space, created by the elimination of Native Americans and others who 
were deemed to have 'no right to the landscape,' became the basis for the National Park system in 
the United States."44  
  If it weren't explicit enough, the extent to which violence is involved in the enforcement 
and perpetuation of colonial ideology, as well as the extent to which agrilogistic philosophies 
and practices are implicated in the material organization of space, should be reiterated. Built on 
the philosophic foundations of the substance-with-accidents ontology and the metaphysics of 
presence, "the colonial world is a world divided into compartments. It is probably unnecessary to 
recall the existence of native quarters and European quarters, of schools for natives and schools 
for Europeans; in the same way we need not recall apartheid in South Africa."45 The rigidly 
bounded categories that separate Nature and Civilization, colonized and colonizer, though 
cooked up in the colonial philosopher's lab, can only be enforced by the barrel and butt of the 
                                               
42 Ibid., 102. 
43 Ibid., 103. 
44 Ibid.  
45 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 37. 
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gun, the deliberate spread of disease, and the intense stratification and segmentation of social 
organization. In other words: by violence. A rigid division of being into neat, tidy compartments 
is just not reflective of reality, and such compartments can only be maintained through real 
violence. Today, we can see continued colonial effects in the ongoing exploitation of the global 
periphery by colonial powers and transnational corporations,46 the prison industrial complex in 
the so-called U.S. as a modern iteration of the institution of slavery,47 the erasure and 
disenfranchisement of Indigenous peoples throughout the colonial world,48 and the emergence of 
global warming and the Anthropocene.  
 The agrilogistic ontological view paved through both human and nonhuman worlds, and 
is the driving force behind the Anthropocene. The process of colonization, in fact, killed so many 
people and disrupted so many ecologies that it actually changed the global climate hundreds of 
years before the industrial revolution.49 Today, we are at the point where "those beliefs were 
hardwired into Earth's surface in a way so effective that millions of lifeforms are now going 
extinct."50 The mass extinction of nonhuman species due to human activity (to the magnitude of 
                                               
46 This analytical framework may distract from the core issue, see Coronil (2000); 6-8.  
47 For an extended discussion, see Davis, and Alexander (2012). 
48 In the so-called U.S., only 573 of the thousands of tribes are federally recognized, and their homes and sacred 
sites are under continual attack. Standing Rock is but one of many examples. 
49 Koch, Alexander, Chris Brierley, Mark M. Maslin, and Simon L. Lewis. 2019. "Earth System Impacts Of The 
European Arrival And Great Dying In The Americas After 1492". Quaternary Science Reviews 207: 13-36. 
doi:10.1016/j.quascirev.2018.12.004. 
 
50 Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology, 30. 
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dozens a day),51 deforestation of critical ecological environments like the 'Amazon lung,' 
dumping and spillage of hundreds of thousands of gallons of wastes into waterways,52 irradiated 
US military munitions alone contaminating nearly 15 million acres of land,53 the choking out of 
vast swaths of sea life via plastics and islands of trash deposited in the ocean, and the 
unfathomable levels of pesticides used to maintain homogenous crop growth spilling into water 
tables are but a few examples of the violence, across many spaces and timescales, that is not only 
destroying lifeforms at unprecedented levels, but destroying the refuges where lifeforms may 
recoup from human-inflicted violence. "Right now, the earth is full of refugees, human and not, 
without refuge."54  
 The colonial situation we are calling into question, then, to reinvoke Fanon's epigraph to 
this section, is not merely theoretical; it is the very fabric of the material and social organization 
of modernity, and has devastating effects at a planetary magnitude.  
Agrilogistics and Bureaucracy 
 What does all of this have to do with bureaucracy? The substance-with-accidents 
ontology and the metaphysics of presence provide necessary philosophical groundings for 
bureaucratic organization—the top-down managerial capacity that led to the rise of the nation-
state. Bureaucracy, like agrilogistics, fundamentally relies on a set of beliefs that render the 
                                               
51 This is against a "background rate" of about one to five per year. The WWF has noted how, in 2014, 50 percent 
of animals on Earth had disappeared in the last forty years. See "The Extinction Crisis". 
2019. Biologicaldiversity.org. 
https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/biodiversity/elements_of_biodiversity/extinction_crisis/. 
52 The pipeline leakage in Standing Rock, as but one example.  
53 "The Environmental Challenge Of Military Munitions And Federal Facilities | US EPA". 2019. US EPA. 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/environmental-challenge-military-munitions-and-federal-facilities. 
54 Donna Haraway, "Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin", 160. 
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world a place where "nothing is real that cannot be quantified, tabulated, or entered into some 
interface or quarterly report.,"55 reinforcing "the sense that we live in a universe where 
accounting procedures define the very fabric of reality."56 The two-poled ontological system of 
the substance-with-accidents model and the metaphysics of presence readily supplies this belief; 
substance is the primary existent, and is fully knowable through the proper application of reified, 
colonial Reason. Weber, incidentally, describes bureaucracy as reason in action. 
 As the "water in which we swim,"57 it is difficult to identify the functioning of 
bureaucracy, even as it has come to inform nearly every aspect of our existence: we currently 
live, according to David Graeber, in an age of "total bureaucratization." Wrought by "the gradual 
fusion of public and private power into a single entity, rife with rules and regulations whose 
ultimate purpose is to extract wealth in the form of profits,"58 the influences of bureaucracy are 
difficult to point to precisely because they have become the pretext upon which nearly every 
social encounter is mediated; "one can see its effects in every aspect of our lives. It fills our days 
with paperwork. Application forms get longer and more elaborate. Ordinary documents like bills 
or tickets or memberships in sports or book clubs come to be buttressed by pages of legalistic 
fine print."59 However, bureaucratic functioning has effects beyond mere form-filling. "The 
                                               
55 Graeber, David. 2015. The Utopia Of Rules. Melville House Publishing, 27. 
56 Ibid., 107. 
57 Ibid., 6. 
58 Ibid., 14. 
59 Ibid., 14. 
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bureaucratization of daily life," Graeber argues, "means the imposition of impersonal rules and 
regulations"60 applies throughout the whole gamut of social organization.  
 Because these rules and regulations are impersonal, not produced nor controlled by the 
persons they are applied to, they can "only operate if they are backed up by the threat of force."61 
An increase in the operation of bureaucracy spells "an increase of the range and density of social 
relations that are ultimately regulated by the threat of violence."62 We have already observed this 
in the case of colonial rule. The strict compartmentalization of Nature and Civilization, 
motivated by the substance-with-accidents ontology and the metaphysics of presence, was an 
impersonal schema; that is, a schema crafted without regard for the particular context in which it 
operated, applied at every level of colonial social organization to humans and nonhumans alike, 
and enforced strictly through violence or the threat of violence. Non-European peoples were 
cordoned off from European social space, their enslavement was rationalized as the Natural order 
of things, and Indigenous ways of life and systems of knowledge were systematically denigrated, 
disrupted, and destroyed. The production, naturalization, and violent enforcement of simple, 
impersonal schema just is the function of bureaucracy. 
 "The totalitarian-ideological class in power is the power of a topsy-turvy world: the 
stronger it is, the more it claims not to exist, and its force serves above all to affirm its 
nonexistence."63 Bureaucratic functioning has become so deeply normalized that it seems almost 
                                               
60 Ibid., 21. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Debord, Guy. 2016. Society Of The Spectacle. Black & Red, 106. 
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absurd to name it as an arbitrary and necessarily violent mode of organization, yet it is crucial 
that we understand it in this way. To secure this point, Graeber is worth quoting at length: 
 
"We are not used to thinking of nursing homes or banks or even HMOs as violent organizations — 
except perhaps in the most abstract or metaphorical sense. But the violence I'm referring to here is not 
abstract. I am not speaking of conceptual violence. I am speaking of violence in the literal sense: the 
kind that involves, say, one person hitting another over the head with a wooden stick. All of these are 
institutions involved in the allocation of resources within a system of property rights regulated and 
guaranteed by governments in a system that ultimately rests on the threat of force. 'Force' in turn is 
just a euphemistic way to refer to violence: that is, the ability to call on people dressed in uniforms, 
willing to threaten to hit others over the head with wooden sticks. 
  It's curious how rarely citizens in industrial democracies actually think about this fact, or 
how instinctively we try to discount its importance. This is what makes it possible, for example, for 
graduate students to be able to spend days in the stacks of university libraries poring over Foucault-
inspired theoretical tracts about the declining importance of coercion as a factor of modern life 
without ever reflecting on the fact that, had they insisted on their right to enter the stacks without 
showing a properly stamped and validated ID, armed men would have been summoned to physically 
remove them, using whatever force might be required. It's almost as if the more we allow aspects of 
our everyday existence to fall under the purview of bureaucratic regulations, the more everyone 
concerned colludes to downplay the fact (perfectly obvious to those actually running the system) that 
all of it ultimately depends on the threat of physical harm."64 
 
Bureaucratic functioning predates even the emergence of agricultural society, which, as Derrida 
points out, itself presupposes industry.65 "Agriculture is already an industry from the beginning, 
and not just logically but physically: it requires metal, wheels, and all kinds of implements. And 
it demands an 'industrial' view of the world as much as it carves out such a view and literally 
                                               
64 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, 36. 
65 Derrida, Jacques, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, and Judith P Butler. 1967. Of Grammatology. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. Qtd. in Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology, 83. 
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ploughs ahead with it."66 The industrial view of the world is an agrilogistic view—the substance-
with-accidents ontology and its accomplice, the metaphysics of presence—and functions through 
the application of simple schema to understand and manage the complexities of real existence; 
which is to say, it functions bureaucratically.  
 In order to subvert bureaucracy and begin to understand and engage with things in ways 
that aren't predicated on violence, a necessary step towards living and dying well in the 
Anthropocene, we have to look towards its causes. Graeber, towards the end of his study of 
bureaucracy, The Utopia of Rules, offers an answer: "what ultimately lies behind the appeal of 
bureaucracy is a fear of play."67 What, then, is play, and how might we begin to understand play 
as not only an anxiety that precipitated the formation of bureaucratic society, but as something 
that underlies it, as a quality intrinsic to being at all? 
 Let us now turn to these questions. 
  
                                               
66 Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology, 82. 
67 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, 109. 
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Without Man and Nature, all creatures can come back to life. 
 —Anna Tsing 
 
Our reasoning, so sure of itself among things inert, feels ill at ease on this new ground. 
 —Henri Bergson 
 
Interlude: Play 
 We have just seen how the substance-with-accidents ontology and the metaphysics of 
presence, through their bureaucratic functioning, underpin the immense violence of colonialism 
and the continued colonial present and are active contributors to the emergence of the 
Anthropocene. If Graeber is right in his assessment, and I think he is, that bureaucratic 
functioning is underpinned by a fear of play, orienting ourselves towards play may be the best 
chance we have at subverting bureaucracy and agrilogistics. In orienting ourselves towards play, 
the uneasy, ambiguous, shimmering68 real suffocated by the metaphysics of presence can once 
again breathe in our worlds; all creatures can come back to life.  
 So, what, exactly, is play?  
 For Graeber, play insinuates a kind of unbounded freedom; a "pure expression of creative 
energy,"69 which itself cannot, intrinsically, be rule-bound. Play, in this sense, can only exist as 
an abstract concept, a general potentiality. But there is also, as Whitehead notes, a 'real' 
                                               
68 "It is a capture that is all over the place: water capturing and reflecting the sun, the sun glinting on the water, the 
eyes of the beholders captured and enraptured, the ephemeral dance of it all. It is equally a lure: creatures long to be 
grabbed, to experience that beauty, that surprise, that gleaming ephemeral moment of capture." From Deborah Bird 
Rose, "Shimmer", G53. 
69 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, 111. 
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potentiality as well, "which is conditioned by the data provided by the actual world."70 Here, 
Marx may put it best: people "make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it in circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given and transmitted from the past."71  
 Play in the real is not 'freedom' in the sense Western thought typically conceives it; play 
is a lot more like wiggle room, the 'real' potentiality Whitehead associates with creativity.72 
Though we may be strung in all directions by (physical, social, psychological, political) rules, 
games we have no say in,73 these rules are always strangely distant from any particular 
situation—allowing us some space to shimmy in a way that cannot be attributed to mere 
ignorance. That is; play is an ontological condition, not merely an epistemological one. Being, 
not just knowing, entails ambiguity. This is due in part to the radical withdrawnness of objects, 
which will be discussed at length below.  
 Play pervades every relation, whether those relations are between nonhuman beings, 
nonliving things, or even an entity and its own internal qualities. In evolutionary theory, for 
example, play manifests as a kind of performativity called satisficing: "as a duck, you just have 
to look and quack enough like a duck to pass on your genes";74 the rules of the game of species-
being, against the assertions of the metaphysics of presence, are never clearly available. 
                                               
70 Whitehead, Alfred North. 1978. Process And Reality; An Essay On Cosmology. Free Press, 65. Qtd. in 
Halewood. 
71 Marx, Karl, and David McLellan. 2009. Selected Writings. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 300. Qtd. in Halewood. 
72 Whitehead actually coined the term creativity, and argued that everything, not only humans, are creative.  
73 Games are rule-governed systems designed to eliminate ambiguity. Graeber notes how bureaucracies are games, 
just games that are in no sense fun. The same is true of States, Economies, etc.  
74 Morton, Timothy. 2013. Hyperobjects. University of Minnesota Press, 41. 
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Performing duck-ness (or human-ness or cat-ness etc.) is an ambiguous, uneasy play between the 
perceived rules of duck-ness and the actual scenario at hand. This kind of performativity is true 
even of nonliving things; not even electrons know exactly what it is to be an electron! "Quantum 
theory is performative too: If it walks and quacks like an electron, it is one."75  
 Importantly, there is no level at which an ultimate game resides; no point from which all 
of reality can be splayed open and objectively examined as the result of a few rules.76 Reality, 
rough approximations aside, is not a machine. Because of this, we must hold the lenses through 
which we examine the world lightly, recognizing that they are indeed games through which we 
render the world intelligible, and as such are irreducibly limited in their access to the real. This 
conclusion comes on the back of the findings of deconstruction, where everything is a metaphor 
in a strong sense. Even saying everything is a metaphor is a metaphor for the deeper rumblings 
of incomprehensibility that pervade the contextually dependent meaning of speech, and indeed 
language itself. Though, because things are real, some metaphors are undeniably precise in their 
assessments. But this does not entail they are the end-all-be-all of inquiry. There is no one game, 
no one lens, to rule them all, even as some bring us deeper into the real than others. 
 It is amidst this profound, playful ambiguity that the ontology of play pitches its tent.  
 In navigating this ambiguity, I have found that an experimental approach to writing has 
been the most fruitful for my understanding. The intention is not to discredit the efforts of more 
scientific, technical writing styles; indeed, many of the works I draw from articulate their views 
in such a way. Rather, the intention with experimental approaches to writing is to open the field 
                                               
75 Ibid. 
76 This is because, for OOO, there is nothing but the interiors of objects. It is objects all the way up and all the way 
down. This will be addressed further in the following section. 
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of meaning-making and apply a careful eye to the exceptions and particulars that inhabit, and 
ultimately subvert, the generalizing assumptions of traditional scientific systems.77 Lynn Keller, 
discussing the approach to experimental writing taken by Adam Dickinson, provides a succinct 
articulation: "in Dickinson's view, we need to recognize the semiotic nature of science as well as 
the contributions experimental poetics can make to understanding the world science explores by 
expanding the current field of signification"78 In Percy Shelley's words, experimental writing is 
one of the means through which we can "imagine that which we know."79 
 An Ontology of Play, then, is less a rigid set of arguments and more the animating 
impulses that drive my continued engagement with the real. An Ontology of Play consists of 
snapshots of an understanding-in-motion. Eschewing the metaphysics of presence, the idea that 
to be real is to be constantly present, means that we have to think things as weird; flickering in 
and out of perception, haunting us from the unthinkable implied in any system of thought. It 
means thinking things as ghosts.  
 Throughout what follows, I'll refer to these ghosts as objects, bodies, and entities. 
Objects, for the technical heft imbued in that term through the efforts of the object-oriented 
ontologists. Bodies, to emphasize their materiality; to help us think of the caress of the wind on 
our skin as a relation between ghosts. Entities, finally, to emphasize their ethereal, uncanny 
qualities. That is, to emphasize that they are ghosts. 
                                               
77 As Agamben points out, exceptions to systems are not merely incidental, but are actively constructed by the 
system. If traditional science has excepted ghosts, a path to subverting its violent machinations may be found in 
turning our attention to such ghosts.  
78 Keller, Lynn. 2018. Recomposing Ecopoetics. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 68. 
79 Shelley, Percy Bysshe, Donald Henry Reiman, and Neil Fraistat. 2002. Shelley's Poetry And Prose. New York: 




"I look around and look around again. It is an emptiness now, this land. It is an emptiness of the dead 
creatures and plants. It is a ghost land, a spirit land of keening winds. And the winds are voices, the 
whispering sorrow of creations gone before their time." 
 —Peter Blue Cloud/Aroniawenrate 
 
"The winds of the Anthropocene carry ghosts—the vestiges and signs of past ways of life still charged in 
the present." 
 —Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet 
 
"Yes, the whole world is haunted! Only is haunted? Nay, it itself 'walks,' it is uncanny through and 
through." 
 —Max Stirner 
 
Ghosts: An Ontology of Play  
 Abstract: Objects are everything, and everything is an object. Objects are entangled, in 
twists and knots, in playful confederations of being from which no object can escape. These 
objects are never fully present, they are ghosts; their smell, their taste, how they sound when we 
tap them with our fingers, even their physicality is but a sliver of the murky depths beyond 
appearance. Objects pulse in and out of our worlds according to rhythms that are their own, 
living vibrant lives elsewhere among other quivering, ghostly bodies. From the mesh they 
emerge, and to the mesh they shall return. The mesh, too, is an object; a ghost in its own. 
 As it stands, humankind (whether any humans are alive or not) will echo through the 
geological record and in ecological arrangements for eons to come. The very large finitude of 
hyper-scale objects like global warming is difficult to conceive from the get-go: many of us have 
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difficulty imagining what we'll be doing in five years, much less what society will look like 
when spent Uranium cores from nuclear power plants breathe their last irradiated breath some 
hundreds of thousands of years from now. Yet, here we are, among styrofoam cups and 
mountains; entities that inhabit worlds with radically different arrangements of 
spacetimemattering80 than our own, entities we must be able to fathom if we are to exist among 
them in ways that do not force us into choosing extinction. Fortunately, since all objects, are 
hyperobjects (just not relative to us), we can still identify some of their key features at slightly-
less-than-hyper scales. Hurricanes provide a good middle ground to work from.  
 Hurricanes have the nasty habit, though helpful for our purposes, of tearing through many 
of the same human-centric constructions this thesis seeks to tackle. More concisely, they twist 
and tatter the notion of a clearly demarcated human world, that mythical border between 
Civilization and Nature, life and nonlife, Here and There, and, of particular importance for OOO, 
Subject and Object. Hurricanes are powerful beings, and through them we can begin to think 
some of the core elements that all objects share. Namely, that they are withdrawn, sticky, 
temporally polyphonic, and spectrally vibrant. These features coalesce into what I'm calling an 
ontology of play, where we find that play is always already a playing-with.  
 Before delving into these qualities of objects, I would first like to stress the inherently 
relational way in which objects exist. Though some qualities of objects, what Graham Harman 
refers to as their interior notes, remain vacuum-sealed beyond access (according to their 
withdrawnness), every object is suspended in a web of relations from which it emerges and into 
                                               
80 This is Karen Barad's term for the active process (thus the verb form) of iterative reconstituting of particular 
arrangements of space, time, and matter. One of the main breakthroughs of quantum theories is that space and time 
are entangled in such a way that referring to them as separate does not, indeed can not, grasp them in a way that is 




which it will dissolve. There is no object that stands outside relations with other objects. Even in 
thinking this 'outside' we send a signal, however weak, inaccurate, or misguided, to the fringes of 
thinkability and rouse the outside from its slumber. In other words, we relate to it.  
 The medium of these relations, which will be discussed in more detail shortly, is the 
mesh. Here, I consider the mesh as the body of relations writ large, in which my preferred unit of 
analysis is the assemblage as articulated by Deleuze and Guattari. Assemblages are open-ended 
collectives of entangled bodies, with uneven topographies and distributions of effectivity. Their 
open-endedness means that assemblages leak into the mesh, and the mesh leaks into 
assemblages; there are little bits of everything in everything. Just as Foucault encourages us to 
look at individuals as both being formed by nets of power as well as being vehicles of power 
themselves, assemblages are characterized by strange, loop-like, co-constitutive relations 
between related elements, which includes the assemblage itself as an entity independent of the 
elements within it. Assemblages can be thought to have a structure akin to a rhizome, where each 
component contains information about the whole. This is how plants like tubers can regrow from 
clippings; though the clipping is a mere sliver of the plant, it contains information about the 
whole from which the entire organism can emerge. Visually, we might view assemblages as 
taking the form of mycorrhiza, or the root structure of rhizomes. That such roots resemble 
meshes is all the better for our metaphorical coherence. Now, on to withdrawnness.  
Withdrawnness 
 "Objects always lie beyond any possibility of total presence,"81 which is to say there is no 
mode of access (touching, thinking, pouring-water-on) that exhausts an object or brings it fully 
                                               
81 Harman, Graham. 2005. Guerrilla Metaphysics. Chicago, Il: Open court Publishing Company, 3. 
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into our comprehension.82 This is because an object always is, in Graham Harman's words, 
"aloof from its dealings with the world."83 Irreducibly withdrawn, objects are "neither a 
phenomenon nor any set of phenomena, but [real forces] throwing [their] weight around in the 
world and demanding to be taken seriously."84 Ettore Majorana, a brilliant physicist who 
disappeared under mysterious circumstances, affirmed as much: "disappearance is the only way 
in which the real can peremptorily be affirmed as such and thus avoid the grasp of calculation."85 
Always already present, objects haunt us, each other, and the landscapes they inhabit, leaving 
only traces of their ephemeral passages for others to grasp at; hurricanes and drought are traces 
of global warming, cancers the traces of some long-past endocrine disruptor or stray gamma 
rays; they are hauntings, the passages of past relations charged in the present.  
 Withdrawnness, the impossibility of an object's total presence, is easily thought through 
how hurricanes impose themselves on humans and our worlds. Regardless of where and how one 
experiences a hurricane—at sea, cast in the waves churned by high winds, in a helicopter 
hovering in the eye, following along with satellite projections online—the totality of the 
hurricane always lies beyond these experiences. Hurricanes, and objects in general, defy total 
presence. Each appearance of them is an appearance-for; appearance-for the weather satellite 
tracking its movement, appearance-for me in my house as rain and winds batter the windows, 
appearance-for the frogs and fish plucked from creeks and tides and unceremoniously deposited 
                                               
82 "Formed on the basis of the Latin word, comprehendere, "to seize," which is formed from the roots: con- (with) 
and prendere (to take)." Édouard Glissant, Poetics of Relation, xiv. 
83 Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 19. 
84 Ibid., 17.  
85 Agamben, Giorgio. 2018. What Is Real?. Stanford University Press, 43. 
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on shore. "In each of these cases, the [hurricane-object] remains somewhat different from 
whatever these entities encounter of it, since none of them ever fully plumbs the depths of the 
[hurricane]."86 This incompleteness of interaction holds for both the living and nonliving entities 
that encounter the object; the birds weathering the storm as well as the roads flooded by it. Each 
entity encounters merely a sliver of the massive, whorling hurricane-object. 
 In suggesting that objects, the supposedly passive nonhuman 'things' that make up the 
brute matter of the world, do access the objects around them in an imperfect way, I (and OOO 
more generally) have broken with the anthropocentric trajectory that has dominated philosophy 
for centuries. However, as we have already seen, the strict divide between Nature (matter) and 
Civilization (form), mirrored in the divide between (non-OOO) Object (matter) and Subject 
(form), is an agrilogistic construct; such a divide is only feasible in conjunction with an immense 
deployment of violence. There is also another, more basic force behind the assertion that 
nonhumans, including inanimate beings, fail to exhaust the objects they come in contact with: 
"All loose initial prejudice concerning the supposed gradation between different types of living 
and inanimate entities must not be smuggled into the realm of basic ontological assertions."87 In 
other words; it is the twelve-thousand-year history of agrilogistic functioning that has 
conditioned us to be hostile to any and all notions that might suggest that nonhuman things 
access the world rather than merely compose it. Recognizing the vibrancy of materiality, waking 
up from our anthropocentric dreaming, would mean we would have to face up to the violence we 
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have inflicted against what we have thought of as mere matter for thousands of years; that is, we 
would have to face up to the horrors of the Anthropocene.  
 Between what a thing is and how it appears, whether that thing is a human, a tree, a dry-
erase marker, or a geological epoch, there is an unbridgeable schism. Objects "cannot be splayed 
open and totally grasped by anything whatsoever, including themselves."88 This holds true of 
both theory and praxis; "the central rift is not between conscious and unconscious human 
activity, but between objects and our relations with them, whether these relations be explicit and 
lucid or tacit and vague."89 This is the radical conclusion drawn by Kant's correlationism, though 
Kant himself shied away from the implications. Correlationism holds that "when I try to find the 
thing in itself, what I find are thing data, not the thing in itself."90 Further, "I grasp that data in 
such a way that a thing does not (meaningfully) exist (for me) outside the way I . . . correlate that 
data."91  
 This stands in stark contrast to the features of agrilogistic and bureaucratic functioning 
we examined earlier. That everything is a correlator means that there is no place where the 
metaphysics of presence holds: there is no level of the real at which everything can be rendered 
fully present. Though Kant tried to backtrack away from this discovery, claiming that it was only 
the Rational Human who correlated, the ontological position that underpins that move is the very 
same substance-with-accidents model already addressed; there is matter over there, the bland, 
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89 Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 190. 




lifeless stuff of the world, and We Correlators over here. But this is precisely what the 
conclusions of correlationism say cannot be true! There is no mutual contact between the things-
in-themselves. Humans see human-flavored correlates of things, just as cats see cat-flavored 
correlates of things and bees see bee-flavored correlates of things. Saying that only humans can 
correlate is to default to the very same ontological position responsible for the mess of the 
Anthropocene.  
 While we are bound to anthropo-morphize—to have human-flavored correlates of things 
and not cat or table-flavored ones—that doesn't mean we are bound to anthropo-centrism, which 
posits humans as the superior or sole correlators. To tune correlationism to frequencies beyond 
the human, and to begin understanding the strange and mystical worlds in which we find 
ourselves, we merely need to relax the "anthropocentric copyright control on correlationism, 
allowing nonhumans like fish . . . the fun of not being able to access the in-itself."92  
 On this view, where objects never fully plumb the depths of other object's being "even 
when they smack headlong into one another,"93 causality is necessarily indirect, because the 
withdrawn nature of objects means that "no two objects can encounter each other directly."94 
There is no mutual contact between the bedrock inner realties of the things-in-themselves. In lieu 
of a direct, mechanical theory of causation (of the sort we imagine when billiard balls smack into 
each other), the withdrawn nature of objects means that they influence each other in the 
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93 Timothy Morton, Hyperobects, 36. 
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aesthetic-causal realm: a strange, thick medium between objects that is simultaneously distant 
from and intimate with them.95  
 Cause and effect, rather than churning below objects, actually happens in front of them 
(ontologically, not spatially). In order for causality to happen, objects must already share a 
medium. This medium does not exhaust the objects within it, undermining them into a purely 
mechanical substratum, nor do the objects within it exhaust that medium—fully plumbing the 
depths of all relations that occur within it. The medium of causality between objects, then, is 
itself an object. In other words, in order for there to be causality at all there must always already 
be objects. Timothy Morton calls this causal realm that waves in front of things, squarely 
situated in the realm of aesthetics, that is, the realm of their appearances-for other objects, and 
not in some underlying beyond, the mesh.  
 The relations between meshing bodies are, too, bona-fide objects themselves; entities that 
cannot be exhausted by their interactions with other bodies. None of the objects engaged in 
relations are exhausted by those relations, nor is the relation itself exhaustible; "there is an 
effectivity proper to the grouping as such."96  This means that the mesh, rather than existing as a 
neutral container of the sort that we are used to in thinking the Cartesian void, which holds things 
while remaining uncontaminated by them, is actually an emergent property of interobjective 
relations. Relations are objects, and as such have all of the basic features of objects discussed 
here. This means that any relation, whether conscious or unconscious, in theory or in praxis, not 
only relates to other objects but looses new entities unto the world.  
                                               
95 Indirect causation seems implied in the discovery of "spooky action at a distance," where entangled particles can 
affect each other instantaneously across great distances.  
96 Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 24. 
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 Meshes are powerful tools for thinking this shimmery realm of effect and affect, because 
they imply both hard-forged connection as well as conspicuous absence. There are a few 
shortcomings to the term, however. Though bodies do, as literally as it is possible to state it, 
mesh together as the synchromesh in the manual transmission of a car does, meshing is not a 
purely mechanical phenomena (nor could it be, due to the nature of causality). Here, I believe 
Jane Bennet's description of assemblages invokes the mood more precisely: meshings between 
objects, far from lifeless, mechanical configurations, are "living, throbbing confederations that 
are able to function despite the persistent presence of energies that confound them from within. 
They have uneven topographies, because some of the points at which the various affects and 
bodies cross paths are more heavily trafficked than others, and so power is not distributed 
equally across its surface."97 Importantly, no one element in the mesh has absolute authority; 
there are no dictators in the assemblage. Play, as I have noted, pervades every relation, and as 
such no entity can consistently determine the trajectory of an assemblage—there is always the 
possibility of subversion. 
 Through the fleshy, meshy realm of vicarious causation, objects leak into each other's 
worlds and carve themselves into each other's forms. Bodies are "surfaces onto which causality 
has been inscribed."98 Think of a hard drive. When you save something to your computer, that 
data is physically written onto the storage disk in a language the computer can understand so it 
can be recalled for use later on. The surface of the hard drive becomes a record of everything that 
was ever written on to it, even when data is erased or rewritten. The form of an object is the 
                                               
97 Jane Bennet, Vibrant Matter, 23-24. 
98 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects, 91. 
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memory of everything that has ever happened to it. But form never totally encompasses or 
reflects memory; there is always a loss in translation. The bits and bytes read from a hard drive 
don't fully capture the object that was written on to it.99  
 The strange entanglements of form and memory render the mesh a kind of spectral plain, 
where a flower "is a speaker for the dead"100 and long-extinct megafauna can be found in the 
regeneration ability of oak trees.101 In the mesh, objects are both haunted, scarred and molded by 
barely discernible others, and haunting, scarring and molding other objects as they encounter 
them in their wanderings. These "hauntings are not immaterial. They are an ineliminable feature 
of existing material conditions."102 Objects, leaking "through a thousand sieves, emerging as 
translated information on the other side of the mesh,"103 shake us from our anthropocentric 
dreaming as visitors, quite literally, from other worlds. Whether we can understand them or not, 
"they're here."104 
 For the very same reason that an object can never be totally present, the unbridgeable 
schism between what an object is and how it appears means that there is no transcending the 
                                               
99 songs and pictures are "compressed," information is cut out to reduce file size 
100 Haraway, Donna. 2017. "Sybiogenesis, Sympoiesis, and Art Science Activisms for Staying with the Trouble". 
In Arts Of Living On A Damaged Planet, M25-M50. University of Minnesota Press, M33. 
101 Svenning, Jens-Christian. 2017. "Future Megafaunas; A Historical Perspective for a Wilder Anthropocene". 
In Arts Of Living On A Damaged Planet, G67-G86. University of Minnesota Press. 
102 Barad, Karen. 2017. "No Small Matter; Mushroom Clouds, Ecologies Of Nothingness, And Strange Topologies 
Of Spacetimemattering". In Arts Of Living On A Damaged Planet, G103-G120. University of Minnesota Press, 
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mesh, that there are no emergency exits out of the spectral plain. We cannot "rise above the 
murmuring sensuality of the world in which [we] bathe"105 to the place of total, immanent 
presence promised by the metaphysics of presence. Instead, we always find ourselves somewhere 
(a bedroom, a boardwalk, an episteme), doing something (eating a bagel, admiring a sunset, 
humming along to music). That is, we are always already playing-with the objects among us; 
there is no 'outside' of relations with other bodies, nor is there an 'objective,' uncontaminated 
standpoint from which to assess them. The inescapable sincerity with which we engage with 
objects hints at another one of their shared qualities: stickiness. It is towards this stickiness we 
will now turn. 
Stickiness 
 The stickiness of objects describes their uncanny ability to never be fully escapable. That 
is, for OOO, the world is made of nothing but the interiors of objects.106 Wherever we go, 
whatever we do, objects cling to us—immersing us in their worlds and writing us into their 
histories. The more we learn about evolution, for instance, the more we find how stuck in it we 
are. Some evolutionary biologists, finding symbiotic relations to be so essential to life that 
organisms cannot rightly be considered individuals, have turned instead to the holobiont 
collective to describe living entanglements.107 Bacteria, viral insertions, calcium; objects so 
                                               
105 Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 39. 
106 Ibid., 192. 
107 The holobiont is defined as "the multicellular eukaryote plus its colonies of persistent symbionts." The findings 
of this research dissolve the biological individual into a collaborative effort between many different entities, living 
and nonliving alike. Living bodies are much closer to collective living arrangements than individuals. Or, in the 
researcher's words, "we are all lichens." Gilbert, Scott F., Jan Sapp, and Alfred I. Tauber. 2012. "A Symbiotic View 




thoroughly knotted and congealed into human form they are not merely in our face, "they are our 
face."108 Humans beings are irredeemably stuck to bacteria and bone, our bodies are chimera; 
monstrous beings with no central head, no dictator.  
 Objects are sticky in part because they are nonlocal—that is, they are not easily pinned to 
any particular position in spacetimemattering; objects elude the boundaries we impose on them 
(another testament to their playfulness). More precisely, nonlocality indicates that being 'place'-
able in time or space is an epiphenomenon resting on top of an otherwise aspaciotemporal 
substratum. Place-ability may be a feature of our experience of the world, but it is not a part of 
the bedrock structure of the world as such. Any one hurricane-event, for instance, stretches 
beyond merely the time of raging seas and high winds. Hurricanes continue to haunt us, to stick 
to us, as we rebuild, for years, in their wake. But the hurricane does not stretch on infinitely. 
There is a point at which its effects are no longer felt, though we can't ever point to exactly when 
that occurs. The hurricane is a very large finitude, not an infinity, but its boundaries are blurry 
and porous rather than thin and rigid.  
 Magnified down at the quantum level, nonlocality appears to be foundational to the way 
the universe operates. The advent of quantum physical theories has encouraged us to look at 
particles, like electrons, as less of a rigid, bounded thing and more "a blob that contains 
something like a particle, distributed . . . across a range of locations according to probability."109  
These probabilistic blobs span massive amounts of spacetimemattering, leading some physicists 
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to use the Solar System as the starting frame of reference for finding the location of a single 
particle.110  
  Particles, especially very tiny ones like quanta, will also 'stick' to the devices used to 
measure them, offering another insight into the stickiness of objects. Measurement, which at the 
quantum level is really just deflection,111 occurs within the mesh, since there can be no direct 
communication between subterranean realities of objects as we have already seen. Being in the 
position to measure an object, then, requires already being inside the influence of that object.112 
That is, as Husserl has shown, "it is false to think that we [or any other object] encounter 
particular visible manifestations of a thing before we encounter the thing as a whole."113 A 
satellite tracking a hurricane's movement doesn't receive information at a comfortable, detached 
distance. Rather, the satellite is just as looped in with the hurricane it measures from outside the 
atmosphere as the flotsam, toads, and coastal marshes are looped in with the hurricane on the 
Earth's surface, though none of them fully capture the totality of the hurricane-object. If the 
satellite measures the hurricane, it is always already inside of the hurricane. In the physics world 
this is called complementarity, "in which what we see is glued to the equipment that sees it."114 
                                               
110 Ibid. 
111 In the quantum world, measurements are conducted via collisions between electrons, photons, quarks, etc. Karen 
Barad (2017) contends, along with other quantum physical theorists, that there is no divide between the quantum 
world and the macro-scale world. This would mean that all measurement, of any kind, relies on some sort of 
deflection. 
112 If we accept that the spacetimemattering blob of any particle extends to at least the edge of the Solar System, 
this is not a far conceptual leap.  
113 Graham Harman, Guerilla Metaphysics, 191. 
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 Complementarity, in this sense, is really just the physics word for correlation. As Kant 
already noted, we never encounter the things-in-themselves (what here we have discussed as the 
withdrawn notes of objects), but only the thing-data. The equipment used to measure objects 
never brings those objects fully into perception but instead translates them into intelligible 
chunks of thing-data. This thing-data is always produced within a context, among the objects 
encountered and not at some metaphysical outside. This holds whether the equipment making the 
measurements is an eye, a finger, a theoretical tool, a language, or computer modelling software. 
What answers we receive about objects is intimately related to the questions we ask of them; 
what we see is glued to the equipment that sees it.  
 Inside hyper-scale objects like global warming, this stickiness is even stranger. Humans 
are stuck to hurricanes as we rebuild from their devastation, but in an even more intimate way 
hurricanes themselves are monstrous prothesis of humankind;115 the anthropos of the 
Anthropocene. Precipitated by the increasingly unstable atmospheric conditions wrought by 
global industrial production, hurricanes are thus a part of our extended phenotype. Like a spider's 
web, produced by spiders yet also not a spider, humankind's extended phenotype "doesn't stop at 
the edge of [our] skin but continues into all the spaces [our] humanness has colonized."116 
Hurricanes are stuck to humans because hurricanes are always a manifestation of global 
warming,117 a geophysical force with which we anthropos are inescapably and irrefutably 
bound.  
                                               
115 Humankind refers to the geophysical entity of which each individual human is a manifestation—the "you" that 
is reading this is a human-drop from the storm of humankind. 
116 Our extended phenotype also includes entities like solo cups, styrofoam, and books. Ibid., 27. 
117 Just as, inside a hurricane, each raindrop or gust of wind is always a manifestation of the hurricane.  
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 Already, in thinking humankind at the geophysical level—where islands of trash, oil 
spills, and hurricanes are but a few of our chimeric appendages—we are stretching beyond 
anthropocentrism. The species of which we are a part resides at a scale far larger than our own; it 
is a monster, and you are a cone in one of its eyes.118 It is the monster responsible for the 
Anthropocene. You have been unconsciously enacting its bidding. Clearly, no individual human 
has control over hurricanes, and indeed each individual's contribution to the warming of the 
planet is statistically insignificant.119 Yet, as humankind turns millions of keys in millions of 
ignitions all over the Earth, the result is a blanket of carbon that suffocates ecologies and shrink-
wraps us together with hurricanes and global warming.  
 Waking up in the Anthropocene, we find that humankind is among a great many other 
monsters; jellyfish, too, are monsters. Ushered into too-warm seas emptied by overfishing, "the 
richness of earlier marine assemblages is overwhelmed. The ocean turns monstrous. Filling the 
seas with sloshing goo, jellyfish are nightmare creatures of a future where only monsters can 
survive."120 This is the kind of weirdness we need to be able to think if we are to live and die 
well in the Anthropocene, and it is precisely the kind of weirdness agrilogistics is designed to 
eliminate. The substance-with-accidents ontology cannot think monsters, because the existence 
of monsters defies the notion that a lack of fish and increased sea temperatures are mere 
'accidental' qualities on top of an otherwise stable substance. Overfishing and rising sea 
temperatures are not mere accidents, they enact irreversible changes in ecological arrangements. 
                                               
118 Timothy Morton, Dark Ecology, 42. 
119 Some individuals, of course, have a significantly higher impact than others. The richest 10% of humans, for 
instance, can be tied to the expulsion of over 70% of total carbon emissions.  
120 Swanson, Heather, Anna Tsing, Nils Bubandt, and Elaine Gan. 2017. "Bodies Tumbled Into Bodies". In Arts Of 
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The metaphysics of presence cannot think beyond the human to the level of humankind, that is, 
the species, because humankind is strangely distant from any individual human. It is a ghost that 
possesses us, not a clearly identifiable and constantly present thing.  
 The rift between the humankind that drives the Anthropocene, a world-geologic event 
spanning hundreds of thousands of years, and any individual human, which, even if lucky, will 
on average live less than a century, illuminates another quality of objects that merits discussion: 
the murmuring, sensuous currents of polyphonic time in which we are immersed.  
Temporal Polyphony 
 If the mesh is an emergent property of interobjective relations that is itself an object, as 
discussed above, so too is time. If objects actually create time rather than merely move through it 
as an inert medium, then movement through the mesh is not characterized by a smooth transition 
along a linear axis of time.121 Rather, objects immersed in the mesh are awash in a veritable 
temporal polyphony, a term I borrow from Anna Tsing. Temporal polyphony is more or less a 
fancy way of saying that each body dynamically unfolds according to its own private rhythm 
rather than synchronizing to some master Time; each object has its own time scale. Temporal 
polyphony points to the reality of time as a "constitutive dimension of social reality."122 In other 
words, time is a dimension of relations, not merely a measure of them. "To even notice" this 
polyphony, Tsing says, "we must evade assumptions that the future is that singular direction 
ahead."123 The notion of time as a linear succession of 'now' points, the smooth passage through 
                                               
121 The notion that objects emit time is supported by recent gaussian theories of spacetime. 
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a neutral container of Time, is the view given to us through narratives of Progress. In contrast to 
these narratives, Tsing offers a view of "open-ended assemblages of entangled ways of [being], 
as these coalesce in coordination across many kinds of temporal rhythms."124 Objects demand 
that we recognize this polyphonic time, "time drawn out like taffy, twisted like hot metal, cooled, 
hardened, and splintered,"125 as communication with them ultimately relies on our ability to 
mesh with objects inside a shared time-space. Synchronizing to objects in this time-space 
happens through what Johannes Fabian calls coevalness. This shared time-space does not 
preexist our relations with other bodies in the mesh. Rather, "coevalness has to be created."126 
 Coevalness, because of the strange, loop-like relations between objects, has a strange, 
loop-like form; like a mobius strip. A mobius strip is a twist that joins two sides of a surface into 
one. However, there is no particular place where the twist happens. Rather, the twist is always 
happening; there is nowhere in a mobius strip that is not already the twist. In the case of time, 
the twist happens as the past (the appearance of an object)127 and the future (the always-
unfulfilled object in its totality) wash into each other, creating a perpetual coevalness or nowness 
that occurs at no specific point; it is always already happening as the result of uncanny, 
indeterminate meshing. Coevalness is an object, and as such it, too, is playful. 128 
                                               
124 Ibid.  
125 Karen Barad, "No Small Matter", G106. 
126 Johannes Fabian, Time And The Other, 31. Emphasis in original. 
127 Appearances are always the past. The delay in seeing something, as it takes a period of time for photons to 
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128 We can watch a hurricane unfold as a linear process from our human scale, so it may be tempting to deny the 
strange loopiness of time. However, hop up a dimension (and include other weather processes) and you find an 
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 Francisco López's La Selva, "an immersion into the sound environments of a tropical rain 
forest in the Caribbean lowlands of Costa Rica,"129 is a beautiful rendition of temporal 
polyphony. López recorded La Selva using minimal equipment, just two microphones on the 
forest floor, and the result is "an astonishing . . . sonic web created by a multitude of sounds from 
rain, waterfalls, insects, frogs, birds, mammals and even plants, through a day cycle during the 
rainy season."130 Calls and cries amplify and distort each other, threatening the listener with a 
solid block of rippling jungle-sound. La Selva resists division; the cacophony assaults the listener 
as an object in its own right, something beyond merely all of the sounds put together. Any 
attempt to elevate an individual entity to pampered isolation, as recordings used for identification 
purposes strive to do, ruptures the fragile resonance that binds the whole aural web together. As 
López explains; "the birdsong we hear in the forest is as much a consequence of the bird as of the 
trees or the forest floor. If we are really listening, the topography, the degree of humidity in the 
air or the type of materials in the topsoil are as essential and definitory as the sound-producing 
animals that inhabit a certain space."131 The rhythms of birds, frogs, crickets, trees, climate 
patterns, and geologic time all interweave to form a shimmering, menacing tapestry of temporal 
arrangement, in which severing foreground and background cannot occur without fracturing the 
sound-object.132  
                                               
Lorenz. The shape of a Lorenz attractor is a loop. Linear time is a human-flavored sliver of the more broadly loop-
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 The interweaving rhythms that compose the mesh are the temporal fragments of object's 
executions133 setting up shop in each other's experiential space: the dynamic becoming of its 
notes echoing through the frequencies of spacetimemattering we and others are equipped to tune 
in to. Because their being is unfolding in a space beyond what we can experience directly, "we 
can only experience somewhat constrained slices of [objects] at any one time."134 Or, as Jane 
Bennet puts it, objects "appear as such because their becoming proceeds at a speed or a level 
below the threshold of human discernment."135 Understanding this polyrhythmic execution is 
essential for understanding objects, especially hyper-scale ones like global warming, because it 
explains how objects can seem to fall out of our worlds even while we remain stuck inside them.  
 I am always already 'inside' evolution, even though nowhere in my daily experience can I 
point to it unfolding explicitly (at least in myself and my fellow humans), just as I am always 
already inside global warming even when it's cold outside. We cannot grasp objects completely 
from our three-dimensional human scale for the simple reason that objects inhabit more than 
merely these dimensions and scales; they are never fully present in our cognitive space, but 
merely pass through it when their unfolding overlaps with ours; when coevalness is happening 
through relation. We can witness a hurricane form, grow, and unleash its power as a process—
that is, a series of events occurring over a period of time—but never the unity of the process or a 
full presence of all its stages. This incompleteness is because we are experiencing the hurricane-
                                               
133 That objects execute is the aspect of Heidegger's tool-analysis from which OOO takes its cue. Heidegger 
contends that while an object executes, it withdraws. It is only when a tool breaks that it appears ready-to-hand, or 
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object "from a standpoint that is 1 + n dimensions lower than that object's dimensionality."136 
The bit of the hurricane that I can see, hear, and feel as rain on my skin is but a small 
spacetimemattering region of the much, much larger object that grips me. Speaking of time is not 
to speak of an empty container which persists even if every object were to be annihilated, nor a 
mere relational quality between objects. "Instead, to speak of time is to speak of the black noise 
on the interior of any object";137 time is "something audible that accompanies a central message 
while somehow remaining extraneous,"138 it is an object in its own right. Thinking temporal 
polyphony tunes us to the "countless times" we are immersed in, "one for every object."139  
Spectral Vibrancy and an Ontology of Play 
 Through withdrawnness, stickiness, and temporal polyphony, we can begin to hear the 
spectral vibrancy of things murmuring in the world. Spectral vibrancy names the way in which 
objects enact and reveal their being as positively existing entities despite their radical 
withdrawnness; how they remind us that they exist beyond their appearance. In Jane Bennet's 
words, spectral vibrancy is "the capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not 
only to impede or block the wills and designs of humans but also act as quasi agents or forces 
with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own."140 It is a vibrancy that has a distinctly 
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spectral quality, as we only ever encounter flickering (that is, not fully present) traces of vibrant 
bodies even as we are wholly inside of them. 
 Because being is relational, because we are always already among the ethereal traces of 
rippling, writhing objects, our play with objects is always already a playing-with. In play, there is 
always another entity—a friend, a toy, a swingset—that makes demands on those playing-with it, 
lest it get angry or break. There is a tinge of horror to this: not only is play inescapable, but we 
can never be quite sure whether what we're playing-with is a squeaky toy or a trickster god, 
because the object at hand is always withdrawn. Like Marie Curie in her laboratory, our play is 
always with ghosts we cannot begin to fathom, ghosts that play with us just as we play with 
them. The horror we feel when the twins in The Shining invite Danny to come play with them is 
precisely the horror of play in the spectral plain.  
 This horror only gets deeper as we learn more about the ways in which humankind has 
been playing with other objects since the emergence of agrilogistics. Not only have we 
smothered objects under the shapeless blanket of passive matter, we have mutilated them as they 
did what they cannot help to do: relate to other objects. Indeed, because objects are inherently 
relational, the colonial drive towards compartmentalization has severed uncountable relations 
between objects that sustain life on Earth as it strove to segment the world into neat, clean 
categories; seeking to pave over the weird loopiness of things. The violence of rigid 
categorization is not merely metaphorical, it has real implications and consequences. Before we 
can begin to play with objects in fortuitous ways, then, we must abandon another longstanding 
hangover from our collective anxiety of play: The Law of Noncontradiction, and its logical 
relative the Law of Excluded Middle. There is, as it turns out, no formal proof for these laws. 
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Thus, as with other impersonal schema, it can only be enforced through violence. We might 
recall Avicenna's epigraph to the first chapter, which summarizes this point quite well.141  
 Our horror cannot give way to defeatism, however. As play pervades being, there is 
always the possibility of subversion, of something better. And, since we anthropos are the ones 
responsible for the Anthropocene, we are the ones obligated to find ways of living and dying 
well amongst our fellow critters. The radical withdrawnness of objects means there is no one 
theory, one mode of social organization to rule them all; thinking or measuring or pouring-water-
on a thing cannot happen from anywhere other than where we are, and where we are is always a 
somewhere that glues itself to experience. Moving away from oppressive regimes of knowledge 
and material organization that try to paper over this withdrawnness means that it's time for us to 
get playful.   
 It means it's time for us to start tuning. 
  
                                               
141 The epigraph can be found on page 12 of this document.  
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Queremos un mundo donde quepan muchos mundos. 
We want a world where many worlds fit. 
 —Zapatista organizing principle 
 
We'll work it all out as we go along. Let our practice form our doctrine, thus assuring precise theoretical 
coherence. 
 —Doc Sarvis, The Monkey Wrench Gang 
 
Everywhere, a new idea of communism is to be elaborated. 
 —The Coming Insurrection 
 
Tuning 
 Abstract: Circumstances as such demand we start going about things differently. 
'Differently' how? My Suggestion is tuning. Tuning engages with bodies outside the academy; 
tuning is tired leg burnings on a crisp walk at night, laughing along with a friend, disrupting the 
function of agrilogistics at every turn. A tuning body aspires for resonance with other bodies, to 
wiggle and waggle, always to its own rhythm, alongside them. Resonances between bodies birth 
new symphonies, themselves resonating with other bodies, bathing in the real birthing 
symphonies of their own. A resonance is always a creation. What bodies we create we are 
responsible for, and Anthropos is responsible for a great many monsters; those wicked ghosts 
that are and are of the Anthropocene. Tuning may help us to live and die well among ghosts.  
 The prior section outlined an Ontology of Play, a relational ontology that seeks to let the 
shimmering, spectral qualities of objects pierce through the liminal spaces paved over by 
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traditional metaphysics; seeking the shine of that strange and ghostly middle banished by the 
Laws of Noncontradiction and Excluded Middle. This section ventures to answer the questions 
begged by the last: How do we coexist with objects, those ghosts that are and of the 
Anthropocene? How do we navigate the world in ways that no longer force us into choosing 
extinction? For this task, I propose tuning. Tuning is the process through which we find and 
create commonalities with other bodies, a process which is intimately bound up with the 
language we have to speak that which is common, and therefore with the ways that we organize 
ourselves materially and politically. Tuning is a relational practice, guided by principles rather 
than strict moral laws. The principles of tuning that I'll explore in this paper are the principles of 
solidarity, taking things on their own terms, and a willingness to play the fool. Before spelling 
out the content of these principles, however, some more background is in order.  
 Heeding Vine DeLoria Jr.'s warning, that "abstract theories create abstract action,"142 a 
body that tunes engages in "the world in which problems are solved";143 that is, the world of sea 
foam, plastic bottles, earthworms, and the ongoing mass extinction event caused by 
anthropogenic global warming—an event (or, rather, a cacophony of events) that is rapidly 
desertifying the planet.144 Desertification is the process by which, through deforestation, 
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drought, or destructive agricultural practices, once fertile land is turned to desert.145 Oceans, too, 
can become deserts. When coral reefs bleach, due to rising ocean temperatures and toxicity, the 
many other lifeforms that depend on the reefs for food and shelter are put under extreme stress. 
Many die out. The Anthropocene is a time of deserts. 
 "To survive at all . . . the desert dweller must develop a prodigious sense of 
orientation."146 Just as, in order for us to hear, our eardrums must waggle along with the 
soundwaves that bombard them, orienting to the bodies around us, with their chorus of 
ephemeral qualities and temporal rhythms, entails a measure of resonance with them. Resonance 
happens when we encounter something in common with another body or share in an effect of its 
presence; "something that is constituted here resonates with the shockwave emitted by something 
over there,"147 quivering along with it like the drums in our ears quiver along with the pulsing 
atmospheric pressure that we interpret as sound. In this sense, resonance between bodies is not "a 
linear process," a process that, after some initial spark (like reading about it for the first time), 
"spreads from place to place" across bodies.148 Rather, like the polyphonic chorus in La Selva, 
resonance "takes the shape of a music, whose focal points, though dispersed in time and space, 
succeed in imposing the rhythm of their own vibrations."149 Tuning, as a relational practice, 
aspires for resonance. Or, rather, since a body that exists is always already resonating with many 
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146 Chatwin, Bruce. 1987. The Songlines. Penguin Books, 200. 
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others as a condition for its own existence, tuning aspires to foster an awareness of these 
resonances, to 'tune in' to them as a radio does a station frequency, and to guide those resonances 
to more fortuitous ends.   
 Merleau-Ponty remarks; "like crystal, like metal, and many other substances, I am a 
sonorous being."150 Reverberating with the rhythms they impose, we resonate among the other 
objects quivering with the mesh. However, because "a body that resonates does so according to 
its own mode,"151 resonance is entirely sincere; that is, frozen in its own phenomenal sphere. 
This has already been discussed elsewhere but is worth revisiting, as it helps us to contend with 
ethical practice as something other than adherence to an absolute set of moral laws, whether 
those laws are ordained by a deity or deities, derived a priori, or given to us through any other 
'objective' or 'impartial' means. 
 As Graham Harman points out, while discussing an insight of Husserl's; "there is no 
absolute boundary between passively received sensation and actively formed objects . . . no 
dualism . . . between sensation and thought, but only a ubiquitous schism between the thing as a 
unit and the myriad sensual facets by which it appears."152 The schism between the thing as a 
unit and the myriad sensual facets by which it appears, facets which engage both our sensual and 
cognitive capabilities, is precisely what freezes us to our phenomenal sphere and keeps the 
totality of entities forever out of our full perception. This 'frozenness,' our always being 
somewhere, means that we are always sincere in our dealings with bodies. Sincerity, Harman 
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continues, "is not located at a single pampered point in reality, but spreads everywhere like a 
vapor or a drifting rain."153 Every perceptive act "is always already an interpretation,"154 a 
relation between bodies that produces new bodies—the objects of experience—that then echo 
into the world along their own trajectories, themselves never fully fusing with other bodies.  
 What aspects of other bodies do appear for an observer, however, will depend on the 
language available to that observer, that is, the means through which that observer identifies and 
engages with other bodies in the world. Each language carries with it an ontology, a set of beliefs 
about what things are. For example, it is difficult for many people in the "Standard Average 
European" (SAE)155 linguistic group to grasp relativity theories when they first encounter them. 
This is not because the Newtonian notions of space, time, and matter are sensed by everyone 
intuitively and general relativity, as a sophisticated physical theory, disrupts our intuition, but 
rather because Newtonian space, time, and matter "are recepts from culture and language. That is 
where Newton got them."156 Our supposed a priori concepts of things are far from 
uncontaminated, 'pure' concepts, they are inherited through the very language that speaks our 
thought, and thus the assemblages of power dynamics and material relations that shape that 
language.  
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 SAE smuggles the substance-with-accidents model of the universe through its very 
syntactical structure. Because "our [SAE] language patters often require us to name a physical 
thing by a binomial that splits the reference into a formless item plus a form," like glass of water 
or lump of dough, "with SAE people the philosophic 'substance' and 'matter' are also the naïve 
idea; they are instantly acceptable, 'common sense.' It is so through linguistic habit."157 It is no 
wonder, then, that Einstein could only describe the rippling, Gaussian spacetime he observed as a 
"reference-mollusk," because his discoveries stretched beyond the ontology implicit in the 
language he had available to speak of space and time. Relativity, and any theories that work with 
its findings, "must be talked about in what amounts to a new language."158   
 Ontologies are not value neutral, as we have seen in the case of the Aristotelian 
substance-with-accidents ontology that imported the subjugation of women as a basic ontological 
fact. Since languages import ontology, languages are not value neutral either. What language we 
have available to speak things is in a reciprocal relationship not only on our linguistic structure, 
as Whorf observes, but in our material and cultural arrangements as well. Languages develop in 
relation to the materials and actions employed in their expression. That is, the assemblages from 
which languages emerge are not merely linguistic. 
 The English language could not proliferate without material elements like pencils, paper, 
notebooks, schooling programs, and the great many other prosthesis required to speak the 
language and render it intelligible to others. Further, what language prothesis are available to 
express language influence the evolution of language itself; "The opening and closing of 
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suckling mammalian lips around the nipple makes an /m/ sound that is surely the basis of words 
such as 'mamma.'"159 Contemporary chaos theories and the language we have to speak of strange 
attractors, high-dimensional renderings of phased entities like climate, could not have developed 
without the aid of the computer modeling software that charts these massively distributed, 
transdimensional entities. The graphics that draws these attractors doesn't merely provide us with 
an incidental visual aid, it is "the scientific work as such,"160 both revealing new information 
about attractors and influencing how we think and speak of them.  
 The assemblages of power that produce languages, too, reveal themselves in a negative 
sense. What is unspoken in language reveals that which the language does not value, or which it 
would prefer to keep behind the veil. Jane Bennet notes how the interjection of formerly ignored 
bodies into the open can radically alter the regime of the visible, thus reconfiguring the relations 
of the visible and the sayable.161 In a similar vein, Gayle Rubin contends that the power of the 
term 'capitalism' "lies in its implication that, in fact, there are alternatives to capitalism."162 That 
is, had we not had the language to speak capitalism, it may have been able to elude our notice, 
much like how the resistance of SAE languages to speaking the vibrancy of materiality or the 
strangeness of relativity exposes the gaps in our ability to speak of the world with the tools at our 
disposal; how entities are excluded by way of the very structure of language.  
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 English, as with all other languages, is bound up with the myriad modes by which it is 
expressed and enacted in the world in a reciprocal, co-constitutive relation; which is to say, in a 
twist. In the case of English and many other European languages, these relations are entangled 
with the birth and amplification of conquest and colonization. The ontology that colonizing 
languages import cannot be severed from the actions and modes of organizing these ontologies 
engender. This is clear not only in the material aspect, where written language prothesis like pens 
and notepads are produced en masse via capitalist modes, but also linguistically in the form of 
common phrases like spending time, which engages with time through an economic relation, 
treating time as the kind of thing that can be 'spent.' In other words, capitalist relations, and 
social relations more generally, exert causal pressure on our languages, enabling and 
encouraging us to speak of things in some ways and not in others. Language does not exist as a 
pure or direct mode of contact with other bodies, but as a means of communicating that carries 
with it biases and assumptions about what those entities are and how they should be treated.  
 Here, we can see how languages are spoken with a material heft. In order for a language 
to proliferate it must inscribe itself into other surfaces, like how writing a letter engages not only 
with the abstract concepts the words convey but also the mutual effect between pencil and paper, 
or how speaking to a friend requires that their eardrums physically waggle along with the aural 
pulses of your words. A language is a resonance with other bodies, a mutual relation that is 
received and translated by the bodies that resonate with it, producing effects that are themselves 
full-fledged bodies. Fanon notes how "the agents of government speak the language of pure 
force," 163 a force driven towards compartmentalization and domination.  
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 As noted previously, no body, human or otherwise, can escape sincere interaction with 
other bodies. Every body has a language, because a body "is not only a material process but is in 
and of language."164 Sincerity makes the existence of an absolute metalanguage, a language 
"that could account for things while remaining uncontaminated by them,"165 impossible. There is 
no 'top' or 'bottom' layer of language, just as there is no top or bottom layer of reality. 
Deconstruction has taught us, exhaustively, that languages do not operate in some metaphysical 
lounge above the quibbling of the world, but are immersed in other bodies—pencils, throat 
muscles, atmospheric conditions, economic production—and are formed and enacted through 
them. To adapt a phrase of Clifford Geertz'; languages don't speak on being, they speak in 
being.166 
 The contextually situated nature of language, and of being in general, means that 
universal or transcendental Good and Bad moral laws are some of the biggest obstacles to us 
actually behaving morally! By collapsing a body to whatever caricature is thinkable within any 
particular moral context, assuming it can be fully described by whatever language is available to 
speak it and thus reducing its full reality to what appears in experience, so-called 'objective' 
morality actually engages with moral thought in an even narrower sense than those who do so 
with a more 'subjective' lens, despite grandiose claims to universality. As Glissant observes; 
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"Generalization is totalitarian: from the world it chooses one side of the reports, one set of ideas, 
which it sets apart from others and tries to impose by exporting as a model."167 
 In their apathy or deliberate disregard for the realities of objects beyond what we humans 
can make of them, the moral decrees passed on by the anthropocentric philosophies of 
theologians, humanists, or eliminative materialists will always fail to navigate the real, because 
they still only engage with reality as something unique to some pampered layer of the real or 
some entity within it; a morality that stems from an ontology that posits a 'more real' or supreme 
level of being will always fail to coexist with objects as things that exist in excess of their 
relations, regardless of whether that supreme level, or metalanguage, appears as God, Man, or 
Molecule (or, in Aristotle's case, as form).  
 Tuning, then, makes no appeal to an 'objective' moral compass; it is unabashedly sincere. 
But to allow for the sincerity of all languages is not to allow that all languages deserve the same 
consideration, and thus tuning can avoid many of the objections levelled against 'subjective' 
moral views. Often, these objections stem from the assumption that, without the firm ground of a 
deity or moral objectivity to stand on, any view that posits moral relativism must grant all moral 
views equal weight. These objections, however, still rely on the substance-with-accidents model 
of the universe, a model that does not accurately represent things in the world and actively 
enables violence against them. By presuming that a recognition of relativity in value entails that 
all values stand on equal footing is to presume some kind of featureless value-lump is what 
underlies all values, upon which the particular values inherent in being a person or a tree or a 
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possum are merely accidents; sprinkles on the cake of what is otherwise an entirely bland, 'easy-
bake' substance.  
 What tuning is grounded in isn't a 'ground level' of reality or an 'objective' assessment of 
moral codes, but the real existence of other bodies. These bodies have a reality beyond what we 
happen to be able to make of them, and have wants, needs, or trajectories that are their own and 
are independent of whatever interpretation is projected on to them, by a human or any other 
correlator. A moral position that states that the destruction of bird nests is permissible, and 
another that says it is not, do not stand on equal footing because there is a real bird that is 
affected by the destruction of the nest in a way that is good or bad for it. Eduardo Kohn puts it 
simply; "our moral worlds can affect [other] beings precisely because there are things that are 
good or bad for them."168  
 A failure to recognize bodies as entities independent of our languages for them begets 
strange, unintended, or disastrous results: In 2016, staff at the United States embassy in Cuba 
began complaining of headaches, nausea, and a loss of memory and hearing, attributing the cause 
to constant high-pitched sounds echoing throughout the building. Some believed the embassy 
was under assault by a sonic weapon. After recordings of the sound were analyzed, however, the 
culprit turned out to be much more benign; amplified and distorted by the walls of the building, 
the oscillating chirp of a cricket is the likely cause of the worker's ailments. The embassy, which 
had been built without taking into account the acoustic signaling of the local insects, became a 
sounding board from which the crickets calls coalesced into pulses strong enough to make the 
embassy staff incredibly ill. The anthropocentric architectural language with which the embassy 
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was constructed is not tuned to the local specificities of Havana, though the building was 
constructed in Havana and not in some placeless modernity. In addition to the strange emergence 
of the nausea-inducing sound-object as a consequence of its ignorance, the building has 
numerous problems with climate control. It was built with "large expanses of unshielded glass in 
a hot, sunny climate,"169 and both the cooling and ventilation systems consistently failed to 
function as planned.170  
 Tuning to other bodies, that is, aspiring for a fortuitous resonance with them, requires 
languages. Languages, as we have seen, are not merely linguistic but entangled in material 
interactions and political arrangements as well in a co-constitutive, symbiotic relationship, and as 
such carry with them an implicit view on what things are real and deserving of recognition. The 
material arrangement of the United States embassy in Havana did not account for local cricket 
populations, nor, apparently, for the sun, and plagued its residents with ghostly, piercing 
vibrations and harsh temperatures as a consequence. Though the embassy is but one withdrawn 
entity in the mesh of withdrawn entities, it shares worlds with them and thus affects and is 
affected by them. This world sharing, in a non-anthropocentric reading of world, is what allows 
us to have things in common with other bodies and is what brings us to the first relational 
principle of tuning; the principle of solidarity.  
                                               
169 Wise, Michael Z. 2014. "The Architectural Importance Of The U.S. Embassy In Havana, 
Cuba". Architectmagazine.Com. https://www.architectmagazine.com/design/the-architectural-importance-of-the-us-
embassy-in-havana-cuba_o. 
170 This example is, of course, not to overlook the emergence of the Anthropocene as stemming from the very same 




 Solidarity describes "a state of physical and political organization, and it describes a 
feeling."171 Paradoxically, solidarity can happen precisely because we are not solid; because we 
exist in a relational way, sharing our human worlds with other bodies and worlds that are not 
human. We have discussed this relational medium above as the mesh. From our childhood, we 
are "involved with flows of milk, smells, stories, sounds, emotions, nursery rhymes, substances, 
gestures, ideas, impressions, gazes, songs, and foods . . . tied in every way to places, sufferings, 
ancestors, friends, loves, events, languages, memories, to all kinds of things that obviously are 
not [us]."172 All of these not-us-es do not coalesce to form some kind of rigidly bounded identity 
or individual, a thing that is easily pointed to and constantly present, but rather a shared, living, 
and dynamic world.  
 World, or the process of worlding, is actually very cheap. To have a world you just need 
to get on with things, "and your world emerges from this getting on."173 Heidegger, when he first 
articulated the concept of world, actually went against his own thinking when he claimed that 
humans were the only worlding beings. Relaxing the anthropocentric copyright on worlding, just 
as, in the prior section, we relaxed the anthropocentric copyright on correlating, means that 
lizards, worms, and water bottles can be worlding beings too. Resonance is the "noise made by 
the uneasy, ambiguous relationship"174 between worlds as they play with each other, and 
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solidarity is the principle that motivates mutually fortuitous material, physical, and emotional 
relationships within these worlds. 
 Thinking worlding in this weak, perforated way "draws [our] attention sideways, away 
from an ontologically ranked Great Chain of Being and toward a greater appreciation of the 
complex entanglements of humans and nonhumans."175 This appreciation allows us to "admit 
that humans have crawled or secreted themselves into every corner of the environment; admit 
that the environment is actually inside human bodies and minds, and then proceed politically, 
technologically, scientifically, in everyday life, with careful forbearance."176 Bodies have 
perforated, communal worlds because to be a body is to be a perforated, communal thing, 
inhabited and traversed by strangers like gut bacteria, electricity, and ideology, which all visit 
our worlds from worlds of their own. From the tattered and spongy notion of world can emerge 
what Jane Bennet calls "the self of a new self-interest";177 a worlding self that is interlinked with 
a great many other worlding selves.178 
 When we act in solidarity, say, with prisoners striking against their enslavement,179 by 
staging noise demonstrations outside their cells, banner drops, or fundraisers for money and 
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supplies, we are tuning in to a mutual harm that plagues us. Though those of us on the outside 
suffer from the prison industrial complex, with its prosthetic swarms of laws, police, and 
surveillance apparatuses, in ways that are very different from the people who are forced to live 
their lives inside prison walls, we all suffer from the existence of prisons and the material and 
ideological institutions that support them.180 This shared experience of harm is precisely what, 
for John Dewey, leads to a "public;" a "confederation of bodies, bodies pulled together not so 
much by choice (a public is not exactly a voluntary association) as by a shared experience of 
harm."181 Acts of solidarity work to navigate, alleviate and repair that harm, leading to an 
increased enjoyment for all those who share in it.  
 Through the principle of solidarity, a tuning body can resonate with other bodies to 
further a mutual enjoyment of the many worlds that constitute their world. How we as tuning 
bodies can come to learn what other bodies enjoy requires another principle, which for lack of a 
better formulation I am recognizing as taking things on their own terms. Taking things on their 
own terms means that we cannot reduce the totality of a thing to its appearance in any particular 
context, nor to the sum of its appearances in a great many contexts, and must therefore treat it as 
something that exists in excess of how it appears for any observer. This is a point that has been 
stressed throughout the entirety of this thesis, but because it has some particular implications for 
how we approach objects from an ethical perspective, that is, how we tune to them, it is worth 
revisiting.  
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Taking Things on Their Own Terms 
 Learning to take things on their own terms requires that we expand our ability to 
understand and respond to the demands bodies make on other bodies.182 Existing in general 
means responding to demands; eating food, using a hammer, or going on a walk all require 
responding to the demands made by your body, the hammer, and the path being followed. And, 
because existing in general also means sharing a world with a great many other worlds, we are 
always already responding to the demands of the great many bodies we coexist with. We can, of 
course, fail to meet these demands, and it is precisely this failure to meet the demands of the 
bodies (outside those recognized as "real" by the oppressive entities of Capital, colonialism, et. 
al., that is, outside those that can be rationalized into bureaucratic relations) that has precipitated 
the horrors of colonialism and Anthropocene.  
 Taking things on their own terms is no easy task, especially within the bounds of a 
(social, linguistic, material, political) language that is systematically hostile to the spectral 
vibrancy of things. How exactly we can make languages more friendly toward these demands 
will be discussed in the final section of this paper, for now it will suffice to deconstruct the 
notion of symmetrical reciprocity that, although it can begin to allow nonhumans in ethical 
consideration and thus enable us to consider the existence of demands beyond the human (not to 
mention within the human), still fails to grapple with them in the ways the numerous ecological 
emergencies we exist in require. 
                                               




 Symmetrical reciprocity, first coined by philosopher Iris Young, is "the belief that one 
can put oneself in another's situation and imagine the world from [their] point of view."183 When 
people perform symmetrical reciprocity, "they get no further than themselves . . . that is, they put 
themselves, with their background, knowledge, experience, and privilege into what they suppose 
is the situation of another."184 Often, this works to "efface difference and disguise relations of 
power."185 That tuning challenges this notion may seem odd at first, as imagining the world from 
another's point of view sounds eerily similar to empathy; a capacity which many view as 
necessary to have any ethical dealings with others at all.186 But what tuning is after isn't 
empathy, it's after something below that: Solidarity. It requires no training, no imagining; 
solidarity is just the base mode of existence. Every lifeform on the planet displays solidarity, and 
Petr Kropotkin has argued that it is through solidarity, what he calls mutual aid, that lifeforms 
coexist with each other.187 To put it more simply, "the ground/ is pro-Communist."188 
  To avoid the pitfalls of an ethics based on symmetrical reciprocity, striving instead for a 
tuning "beyond the human that does not merely project human qualities everywhere,"189 we have 
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to be receptive to the actual demands of other bodies, recognizing that those demands are both 
"necessarily different from, and may actually challenge, ours."190 How can we, bound as we are 
to anthropomorphize, not fall prey to symmetrical reciprocity, that is, centering our own 
experience in our dealings with others? Learning about and dismantling the material and 
ideological structures of power that limit our ability to stretch beyond symmetrical reciprocity is 
a good first step. Beyond that, a willingness to play the fool seems necessary. Playing, here, is 
key, as it can help to stretch and wiggle out from underneath the anthropocentric (social, 
political, material, linguistic) customs that impede our tuning to nonhumans.  
Playing the Fool 
 Because objects are irreducibly withdrawn, we share worlds with them but never fully 
fuse with them or reveal their being completely, bodies require new and creative ways of tuning 
in order to break from the vampiric and devastating oppressive cycles to which we have 
subjected them and ourselves. We share our worlds with plastic debris, and as masses of it 
coagulate into islands, choking out lifeforms as it rides the ocean currents and producing 
cascading extinction, there is a social and political necessity to understanding them; how these 
trash islands form, what effects they have, or how their effects might be mitigated and rectified 
are all urgent problems to address. But where to begin? How do we understand trash islands as 
bodies? There is no easy answer, nor is there any one right answer. Trash eludes human control, 
even if it is the product of (partially) human endeavors. What we have to do it play with it, even 
if it means breaking from convention to do so. Especially if it means breaking from convention, 
since convention is precisely what brought us to this point! I take convention, in this sense, to 
                                               
190 Don Kulick, Loneliness and its Opposite, 268. 
 
Covert 74 
mean the socially acceptable forms of relating to other objects regulated by the polis; the 
political community and place of Rational order, and the etymological root of both "politeness" 
and "police."191 Nietzsche crying along with the horse being beaten is not a bad example of 
playing the fool. 
 Play is foundational to tuning, because it is foundational to being, as we explored in an 
ontology of play. When Felix Hess sped up an audio recording he made outside his apartment, 
playing with the ordinary temporal flow of sound humans are ordinarily attuned to, he uncovered 
a hyperobject; "a humming sound or a rich, deep drone, audible like a multi-engined heavy 
airplane in the distance. This deep droning sound, at times all but inaudible, is formed by 
oscillations in the atmosphere—microbaroms—caused by standing water waves on the Atlantic 
Ocean, far away."192 The recorded fluctuations lie in the range of infrasound, and are quite 
literally unheard of unless tuned to with this kind of audio equipment. Without a willingness to 
explore new or strange avenues of tuning (what happens if I speed this sound up 360 times?), we 
won't be able to grapple with the immensity, not to mention the immense number, of the 
overlapping, enfolded bodies we coexist with.  
 Playing the fool precludes any kind of top-down fix to any problem, not to mention that 
such "solutions" are ontologically impossible (because there is no 'top' or 'bottom' level of 
reality, only the interiors of objects). This is to say there is no absolutely 'right' way to play with 
another body, only degrees of getting along, and getting along in ways that don't generalize about 
the demands of any particular context. Even global warming, a massive, distended object which 
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every being on the planet engages with in some way or another, has its local specificities; "the 
conditions we breathe in are collective and unequally distributed, with particular qualities and 
intensities that are felt differently through and across time."193 That even the UN admits small-
scale farming is the only way to sustain global food supply should give us a hint as to the 
inadequacy of one-size-fits-all approaches to broad social problems.194  
 Tuning precludes organizing in states. It is spoken multilingually, like Glissant's 
Relation; and as such goes "beyond the impositions of economic forces and cultural pressures, . . 
. rightfully [opposing] the totalitarianism of any monolingual intent."195 State structures are 
incapable of tuning, because they rely on bureaucratic reason, a top-down, one-size-fits-all 
structure, and as such are woefully underequipped to handle the many ecological emergencies we 
must contend with. Even the ostensibly communist state solutions to environmental problems 
mirrored the capitalist ones; Lenin famously advocated pumping fertilizers into the soil to 
increase food production efficiency. The flexible, playful, contextually rooted cultivation of 
resonance I have outlined here as tuning compels us towards a "polity with more channels of 
communication,"196 which I contend has the shape of anarchical groupings. "If one knows how 
to move, a lack of schema is not an obstacle but an opportunity."197 
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 This is not as radical as it might seem. In fact, a playful, non-hierarchical (or, at least, 
transiently heterarchical) approaches to social organization is how humans have arranged 
themselves for the vast majority of our existence on this planet, even after the agricultural 
revolution drove us towards city-states (the real story, as one might suspect, is much more 
complicated). What appears to have been most common across many different societies was a 
seasonal, cyclical pattern of social organization, revealing that "from the very beginning, human 
beings were self-consciously experimenting with different social possibilities."198 Further, these 
societies were not confined exclusively to small bands, as we are often told was the case of our 
distant ancestors, but often aggregated in large groups: 
 
"At less favourable times of year, at least some of our Ice Age ancestors no doubt really did live and 
forage in tiny bands. But there is overwhelming evidence to show that at others they congregated en 
masse within the kind of ‘micro-cities’ found at Dolní Věstonice, in the Moravian basin south of Brno, 
feasting on a super-abundance of wild resources, engaging in complex rituals, ambitious artistic 
enterprises, and trading minerals, marine shells, and animal pelts over striking distances. Western 
European equivalents of these seasonal aggregation sites would be the great rock shelters of the 
French Périgord and the Cantabrian coast, with their famous paintings and carvings, which similarly 
formed part of an annual round of congregation and dispersal."199 
 
Further, there is little evidence to suggest that these micro-cities had any rigid hierarchical form. 
If that were the case, "we’d also be finding fortifications, storehouses, palaces—all the usual 
                                               





trappings of emergent states. Instead, over the vast majority of human history and spaces where 
humans lived, we see monuments and magnificent burials, but little else to indicate the growth of 
ranked societies."200 The principle that drove much of this social experimentation, Davids 
Graeber and Wengrow suggest, was an "understanding that no particular social order was ever 
fixed or immutable," precipitating a history where humans succeeded in "confining inequality to 
ritual costume dramas, constructing gods and kingdoms as they did their monuments, then 
cheerfully disassembling them once again"201 for tens of thousands of years.  
 The living alternatives to capitalist and state organization are many; The Zapatista 
rebellion has sustained a vibrant community in the Mexican hillsides of Chiapas since 1994. 
Many Kurdish peoples in Rojava, whose YPG and YPJ militias have garnered international 
attention, organize themselves through the model of democratic confederalism developed by 
Abdullah Öcalan. In the so-called United States, the myriad communities in Standing Rock, the 
Hellbender Autonomous Zone, Camp White Pine, and the many other tree sits spread across the 
country have all forged living alternatives to state capitalist organization through their resistance 
to pipeline construction. In so doing, all of these communities seek to break the devastating 
cycles of industrial capital and environmental racism and renew and repair relations with the 
other bodies, human and nonhuman, with which we all coexist. These are perhaps the most 
powerful examples of tuning I can offer. 
  





The Open Ending 
 In this thesis, I have argued that the bureaucratic functions, both ideological and material, 
that underpin the very basis of modern Civilization are the very same functions responsible for 
the emergence of the Anthropocene; the cacophony of ecological emergencies wrought by 
human activities that today threaten the livability of the planet. In lieu of bureaucratic thinking 
and doing, which relies on the belief that to be real is to be fully and completely present at all 
times, I have sought to think things as rippling, writhing objects. That is, as ghosts. To coexist 
with ghosts, we need ethical orientations that can allow for play, for experimentation, for the 
possibility of organizing alongside objects in ways that do not force us into choosing extinction. 
Living and dying well in the Anthropocene alongside our fellow critters depends on our forging 
resonances with entities that engage with wider frequencies of their contours; their material 
existences as much as their speculative, theoretical ones.  
 
 
The praxis of decoloniality . . . is just this: the continuous work to plant and grow an 
otherwise despite and in the borders, margins, and cracks of the 
modern/colonial/capitalist/heteropatriarchal order. The pedagogies of this praxis are 
multiple. They are sown and grown in the contexts of decolonial struggle, wherever and 
however this struggle is conceived, situated, and takes form.  
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